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This thesis is on MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO). MUO carriers are lacking risk factors 
as described in the national MRSA guideline. Without risk factors, MRSA carriers are not 
screened at hospital admission and go undetected. In general, MUO are detected by 
accident in a clinical culture or in a screening culture searching for a particular outbreak 
strain. Instead a genetically different strain is found. MUO will undermine our Search & 
Destroy (S&D) if left unattended. Important questions such as ‘Which new risk factors 
describe MUO?’, ‘What is the genetic background of MUO?’ and ‘Is MUO a result of new 
transmission routes?’ need answers. In this thesis we try to find these answers. 
chaNgiNg ePiDeMiOlOgy Of Mrsa
During the last decade, the total number of MRSA reported to the Dutch MRSA surveil-
lance has increased. (Figure 1) As has the number of MUO. (Figure 1) Furthermore, 
Dutch MRSA prevalence was 0.03% at hospital admission in 20001 and 0.11% in 20072. 
Nethmap data from 2016 reported an 1.7% MRSA prevalence among reported clinical 
S. aureus isolates (including blood samples) collected by the Infectious Disease Sur-
veillance and Information System for Antibiotic Resistance (ISIS-AR).3 The low Dutch 
prevalence is – together with the Scandinavian countries - the exception to the European 
rule (Table 1). Currently, the number of reported MRSA is about 3000 MRSA isolates per 
year 4. This is a low number, but has increased compared to the past, as this number 
was under 500 MRSA isolates per year before 2001.5 (Figure 1) The current low MRSA 
numbers in The Netherlands and Scandinavia are most likely due to a combination of 
MRSA control measures and a prudent use of antibiotics.6 In this regard, Scandinavia 
and The Netherlands are similar. For example, in their use of MRSA risk groups for MRSA 
screening. Although differences exist (Table 3).
Globally, the epidemiology of MRSA has changed as well. Due to or as a consequence 
of this, is that the classical division between hospital-acquired (HA-) and community-
acquired (CA-) MRSA has gradually faded. The result was a surge of epidemiological 
terms in an attempt to describe the new MRSA situation: CA-MRSA (community-acquired, 
community-associated), HA-MRSA (first meaning hospital-acquired, and then hospital-as-
sociated or healthcare-associated), HCA-MRSA (healthcare-associated), HCA-CO-MRSA 
(healthcare-associated community onset), CO-MRSA (community-onset), HCA-HACO 
MRSA (healthcare-associated hospital-onset), HACO-MRSA (healthcare-associated hos-
pital-onset).7-9 The global change in epidemiology may be a driving factor for Dutch MUO. 
However, it is important to realize that MUO is not by default community MRSA (whether 
labelled as CA-MRSA, CO-MRSA or any of its many variants). The MUO label does not 
seek to impose a spatial division such as is the case with aforementioned terminology 
(CA-, CO-, HA-MRSA, etc.). MUO is simply the absence of known (Dutch) risk factors. 
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chaNgiNg DUtch Mrsa cONtrOl
As epidemiology changes, so must MRSA control. Over the years the number of risk 
factors described in the Dutch MRSA guideline made by the former Dutch Working Party 
for Infection Prevention (WIP; 1981-2017) 10 has gradually increased. (Table 2) The origi-
nal guideline at the start of the 1990’s, listed three risk groups: MRSA positive patient, 
exposure through unprotected contact with a MRSA carrier, and a stay in a healthcare 
centre abroad. The last, from 2012 with a 2016 Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en 
Milieu (RIVM) addendum, lists ten major risk factors (MRSA positive patient, exposure 
through unprotected contact with a MRSA carrier [now including MRSA patients under 
follow-up after eradication therapy and household members of MRSA carriers], and a 
stay in a healthcare centre abroad, being a dialysis patient, contact with pigs11, contact 
with veal calves, contact with broiler chickens, adoption and being an asylum seeker).12, 13 
If the targeted population described in the risk groups is sufficiently distinct of the overall 
population, then MRSA carriers can be successfully discerned. 
Original MRSA guideline for Dutch hospitals                                  1998 version                          2004 version 2007 version                                2012 version
















1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Total number of reported MRSA isolates to the MRSA surveillance at the RIVM
(Estimated) number of reported livestock-associated MRSA isolates to the MRSA surveillance
Estimated number of MUO based on reported epidemiological data to the MRSA surveillance at the RIVM
figure 1 – reported total, MUO and live-stock associated Mrsa isolates to the Dutch Mrsa 
surveillance between 1989 and 2017
* estimated number of MRSA isolates based on published figures (graphs 23-27); 1 Only the number of 
MRSA isolates from patients were given, no health care workers. 2 No or minimal MRSA surveillance 
reports these years, thus no public data to show the number of MUO. This figure was based on the fol-
lowing public sources: 20-44




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In S&D, risk adjustment aims to identify every potential MRSA carrier at hospital (and 
nursing home) admission by screening persons at risk for MRSA carriage (search). Pa-
tients screened positive for risk on MRSA are put into isolation and these contact precau-
tions continue awaiting the results of the medical microbiological laboratory (preemptive 
isolation). MRSA carriers are kept in isolation and eventually treated to eradicate the 
MRSA (destroy) and their environment will be disinfected (destroy).14 
To continue control of MRSA despite changing epidemiology, MRSA must be surveilled. 
Therefore, the MRSA surveillance at the RIVM 4, was started in 1989 at the request of the 
Geneeskundig hoofdinspectie (GHI; now known as Inspectie Gezondheidszorg en Jeugd 
/ IGJ, and formerly known as the Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg / IGZ) 15. The MRSA 
surveillance officially exists to gain insight as to why certain people are infected or colo-
nized by MRSA, and to support the (then) independent Dutch WIP foundation in updating 
the Dutch national MRSA guideline by supplying it data.16 The surveillance keeps track of 
total MRSA numbers, the genetic background (before: phage-type, PFGE-type, spa-type; 
now: MLVA complex; but also the presence of Panton-Valentine Leucocidin virulence fac-
tor [PVL]) and announces any epidemiological changes to MRSA in The Netherlands.17 
To surveil MRSA, the RIVM maintains a database of MRSA isolates, with one isolate 
per unique person per year.17 The first MRSA positive isolate of each detected MRSA car-
rier is send to the RIVM along with some epidemiological information (including the risk 
group the carrier belonged to). Unless there is an isolate from a clinical sample (e.g. from 
a wound) in the same period as carriage is identified, the RIVM prefers this isolate over 
table 2 – Dutch Mrsa risk factors in Dutch Mrsa guideline by WiP working group for infection 
prevention (1989-2018)
Original • MRSA positive patient
• Exposure through unprotected contact with a MRSA carrier
• A stay in a hospital abroad
1998 Guideline now applies for patients AND healthcare workers
2004 Added • Being a dialysis patient
• Contact with pigs
• Contact with veal calves
• Family members of those who have contact with pigs/veal calves
• Adopted children with regular hospital contact
• Other
2007 Removed • Family members of those who have contact with pigs/veal calves
2012 Expanded • Exposure through unprotected contact with a MRSA carrier
 o MRSA patients under follow-up eradication therapy
 o Household members
 Changed • A stay in a healthcare center abroad
 Added Contact with broiler chickens
2015 Added Being a refugee1
Major changes to the Dutch MRSA guideline by the Working group for Infection prevention (WIP).1 Risk 
factor added in the post-WIP era. 
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Proven carrier of MRSA X X X X X X
Unprotected contact with MRSA carrier X X X XT X X
Inside the hospital (as part of contact tracing) X X X X X X
Outside the hospital (household members, partners, caretakers) X X X X X X
Stayed in a local care facility (unspecified) with an ongoing MRSA outbreak on 
the department X X X X
T X X
Stayed in orphanage . X X . . X
related to higher Mrsa prevalence among animals
Contact with industrial live pigs, veal calves or broiler chickens Xb Xb . X Xb Xb
Regardless if professional contact or not Xb Xb . X Xb Xb
And/or lives on such a farm Xb Xb . X Xb Xb
related to higher Mrsa prevalence abroad
Adopted children from abroad living in this country . X . X . X
Foreign dialysis patients . . X X X XS
Local dialysis patients dialyzed abroad . . X XT X XS
HCW involved with patient-related activities in a foreign care facility X . X XTT X XS
HCW guided patients from a foreign to a local care facility without isolation 
precautions . . . X
T . XS
Nursed in a foreign care facility . . X XTT X .
 With risk factors (operation abroad, chronic infection or persistent skin lesions, 
presence of abscesses or furuncles at hospitalization in home country . . . X
p . .
Refugee Camp X . X X X .
Staying abroad . . . . . .
 With risk factors (operation abroad, chronic infection or persistent skin lesions, 
presence of abscesses or furuncles at hospitalization in home country . . . . X .
related to Mrsa eradication therapy
During MRSA eradication treatment . . . X . .
During follow-up after MRSA eradication therapy . . . X . .
Table based on google translated online data from Scandinavia (Denmark46, 47, Finland47, Iceland48, 
Norway47, 49 and Sweden47, 50-52). Table data should be used with care as mistranslation or missing data 
in offline documents cannot be excluded.
b No broilers included; pPatients only; Sin the last six months; Tless than two months ago; TTmore than 
twenty-four hours and less than two months ago
14 Chapter 1
the one from a screenings sample.4, 17 In 2004, a new category, “unknown”, was added to 
the request for epidemiological information, to get an idea of the number of MUO in The 
Netherlands. This addition has made it possible to measure the size of the MUO problem, 
and to study the MUO carriers for their underlying risk factors.
the search fOr Mrsa Of UNkNOWN OrigiN
The Dutch MRSA surveillance database at the RIVM was used to estimate the potential 
size of the MUO problem. A raw estimation was based on data from 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
The potential number of yearly reported MUO was estimated to be 23-27% of MRSA 
patient cases reported to the RIVM.18 In the report form, accompanying the isolate, clinical 
microbiologists and infection prevention practitioners can do suggestions in an open text 
field on the possible source of the MUO carriage. Some suggestions were immigration, 
adoption and nursing homes. However, the reliability of the suggestions was question-
able. Furthermore, the reliability of the questionnaires sent to the RIVM was unknown and 
not sufficient to come to an unequivocal classification and reliable count of the numbers 
of MRSA as MUO.19 A thorough study of MRSA surveillance data on MUO was deemed 
necessary, leading to the national MRSA surveillance database at the RIVM becoming 
the primary source for the research described in this thesis.
thesis aiMs
The primary aim of this thesis is to map the magnitude of the presence of MUO, elucidate 
MUO’s risk factors and/or transmission routes. While the secondary aim is to find out 
whether MUO carriers carried different MRSA strains compared to MRSA strains of MRSA 
carriers with known risk factors (MKO).
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abstract
The Netherlands is known for its low methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
prevalence. Yet MRSA with no link to established Dutch risk factors for acquisition, MRSA 
of unknown origin (MUO), has now emerged and hampers early detection and control by 
active screening upon hospital admittance. We assessed the magnitude of the problem 
and determined the differences between MUO and MRSA of known origin (MKO) for 
CC398 and non-CC398. National MRSA Surveillance data (2008–2009) were analysed 
for epidemiological determinants and genotypic characteristics (Panton–Valentine leuko-
cidin, spa). A quarter (24%) of the 5545 MRSA isolates registered were MUO, i.e. not from 
defined risk groups. There are two genotypic MUO groups: CC398 MUO (352; 26%) and 
non-CC398 MUO (998; 74%). CC398 MUO needs further investigation because it could 
suggest spread, not by direct contact with livestock (pigs, veal calves), but through the 
community. Non-CC398 MUO is less likely to be from a nursing home than non-CC398 
MKO (relative risk 0.55; 95% CI 0.42–0.72) and Panton–Valentine leukocidin positivity 
was more frequent in non-CC398 MUO than MKO (relative risk 1.19; 95% CI 1.11–1.29). 
Exact transmission routes and risk factors for non-CC398 as CC398 MUO remain unde-
fined.
Emergence of MUO in The Netherlands 21
iNtrODUctiON
In the past 20 years, the Netherlands kept methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) at bay through prudent use of antibiotics and a Search and Destroy policy. Part 
of Search and Destroy is active detection and isolation based on defined risk groups. For 
these reasons, MRSA prevalence in Dutch hospitals and community is still low 1,2. The 
Dutch Working party on Infection Prevention developed a guideline on MRSA prevention. 
(Table 1) This guideline defines the national risk groups and the procedure of contact 
tracing around cases is described. The Dutch policy can therefore be seen as targeted 
surveillance on defined risk groups. However, MRSA was found in people who were not 
targeted by the Search and Destroy policy because they did not belong to the defined 
risk groups 3. In the present study, these cases are defined as ‘MRSA of unknown origin’ 
(MUO). MUO can transmit, until detection, because preventive measures are not taken. 
To enable the targeting of control strategies for MUO, the magnitude of the problem was 
measured and the differences were determined between MUO and MRSA of known 
origin (MKO; comprising MRSA risk groups and contact tracing described in the targeted 
surveillance). Materials and Methods Data from the national MRSA surveillance database 
at the National Institute for Public Health and Environmental Protection (RIVM) between 
1 January 2008 and 31 December 2009 were used. All MRSA strains sent to the RIVM 
by 68 Dutch laboratories, covering the whole country, are registered in this database. Of 
the cultures positive for MRSA taken from a single person, one, usually the first detected, 
strain is sent to the RIVM. A check on duplicates in the database further ensured one 
MRSA strain per person. At the RIVM the MRSA strains were confirmed by testing for 
the presence of the mecA gene and the coagulase gene. For all confirmed MRSA the 
spa-type, as described by Harmsen et al. 4, and the presence of the Panton–Valentine 
leucocidin gene (PVL-gene) were determined 5. As there was no significant difference in 
the number and data of reported isolates and carriers between the 2 years, data were 
pooled to increase power. Based on spa-types we distinguished CC398 (livestock associ-
ated strains) and non-CC398 6. CC398 was checked by RIVM with multiple-locus vari-
able number tandem repeat analysis (http://www.mlva.net/). CC398 was analysed as a 
separate group from non-CC398. Each strain was submitted with a form, with background 
information on hospital, demographic patient information, risk factors when applicable 
(Table 1), and other relevant epidemiological information. Laboratories were approached 
by the RIVM to complete their missing data as much as possible. Two defined groups, 
MUO and MKO, were classified based on the included information on defined risk factors 
requested. The absence of either defined risk factors or of risk factors found through 
contact tracing, led to a classification of MUO. Additional remarks were usually made on 
the form and/or the box for ‘Unknown MRSA’ was ticked. Isolates with no or incomplete 
additional epidemiological data (No data), which made classification impossible, were 
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not included in further descriptive and multivariate analysis. Finally, additional remarks 
on the form were categorized to gain insight into new sources and risk factors. The most 
prevalent spa-types were determined for the total amount of MRSA, CC398, non-CC398 
MRSA, MUO and MKO. The spa-types were ranked with rank 1 being the most prevalent 
spa-type within the (sub)group; rank 2 the second most prevalent, etc. SAS statistical 
software (ENTERPRISE GUIDE version 4.2) was used for descriptive analysis, univariate 




Contact with roommates or carrier
Single room shared with MRSA carrier 89 (4%)
Contact tracing 485 (19%)
Foreign
Cared for in a foreign hospital 342 (13%)
Foreign patients at a Dutch dialysis department 1 (0.04%)
Adopted children: hospitalized or frequently visit the outdoor department 62 (2%)
Dutch dialysis patients dialyzed abroad 1 (0.04%)
Livestock
Work related contact with alive pigs or veal calves 1120 (44%)
Outbreak
Patients from another Dutch hospital or nursing home, from a department  128 (5%)
or unit where there is a MRSA outbreak, which is not under control
MRSA Carrier
Proven carrier 119 (5%)
risk groups (healthcare workers (hcW)) hcW (n=255) a
Contact with roommates or carrier
Unprotected contact without infection precautions 165 (64%)
Protected contact with infection precautions 19 (7%)
Contact tracing 33 (13%)
Foreign
Cared for in a foreign hospital 2 (0.8%)
Worked < 2 months ago, but longer than 24 hours in a foreign 10 (4%)
hospital or nursing home
Worked (regularly) in an abroad hospital or escort patients from a foreign  7 (3%)
to a Dutch hospital
Livestock
Work related contact with alive pigs or veal calves 1 (0.4%)
MRSA Carrier
Proven carrier 5 (2%)
MRSA, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
a MRSA in the Netherlands in 2008-2009. A single carrier can have more than one risk.
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analysis (Fisher’s exact test) and multiple regression analysis (log-binomial regression 
model, proc GENMOD). A p value of <0.05 was considered significant. Goodness of fit 
was determined with the area under the curve of a receiver operating characteristic-curve 
(ROCR software). Relative risks (RR) with 95% CI were calculated.
resUlts
general results
In 2 years, 5545 MRSA strains were sent to the reference laboratory and so were avail-
able for analysis: 2671 reported in 2008 and 2874 in 2009. From the 5545 MRSA, 3233 
(58%) were non-CC398 and 2312 (42%) were CC398 (livestock-associated MRSA). The 
MUO and MKO proportions of these groups were determined (Table 2).
table 2 – MUO and MkO proportions among Mrsa
MUO (%) MkO (%) No Data* (%) total Mrsa
Non-cc398 998 (30.9) 1407 (43.5) 828 (25.6) 3233
cc398 352 (15.2) 1386 (59.9) 574 (24.8) 2312
total Mrsa 1350 (24.3) 2793 (50.3) 1402 (25.3) 5545
MUO, Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) of unknown origin; 
MKO, MRSA of Known Origin; CC398, Livestock associated MRSA (LA-MRSA); 
Data are from The Netherlands over a two year period (2008-2009). 
* Excluded from analysis.
Molecular results
A total of 403 different spa-types were identified and 13 strains were not typeable. Five 
spa-types constituted 51% of the total MRSA, i.e. t011, t108, t008, t002 and t064. Among 
non-CC398, 364 different spa-types were identified, of which 210 were MUO and 209 
were MKO. For CC398, there were 40 different spa-types, of which 17 spa-types were 
MUO and 26 were MKO (see also Tables 3 and 4). The spa-types t008 (ST8), t019 (ST30) 
and t044 (ST80) were more often found among non-CC398 MUO than among MKO (p 
<0.01) and type t034 (CC398) was more often found among CC398 MKO than CC398 
MUO (p <0.01). Of all MRSA, 684 (12%) were PVL-positive. For non- CC398 MUO this 
was 461 (46%), for non-CC398 MKO it was 144 (10%) and for CC398 MKO it was 3 
(0.2%) (see also Table 5). There were significantly more PVL-positive t008 (USA300) 
among non-CC398 MUO (106 events, 10.6% of total MUO), than among non-CC398 
MKO (38 events, 1.7% of total MKO) (p <0.01). Comparing CC398 MUO with non-CC398 
MUO Of the 998 non-CC398 MUO, 745 (75%) had added remarks on the form. Of the 
remarks, 101 (14%) were related to (health) care, 104 (14%) to foreigners (contact with a 
foreigner or being one), 95 (13%) to contact with a positive family member and no indica-
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tion for a possible source was obtained from 253 (34%). Of the 352 CC398 MUO, 300 
had added remarks (85%). Fifty (17%) were attributed to a link with animals in general, 
of which 16 were through a positive relative; 28 (9%) were linked to a positive family 
member not involved with any animals, and 197 (66%) had no indication for a possible 
source. Pigs were the specifically mentioned animals for half of the animal related events 
(26; 52%), followed by bovids (9; 14%, seven cattle, one goat, one sheep), horses (6; 
12%) and chickens (3; 6%).












MUO MkO MUO MkO
(n = 998) (n = 1407) (n = 352) (n = 1386)
spa % spa % spa % spa % spa % spa % spa %
1 t011 24 t008 14 t008 17 t008 10 t011 59 t011 59 t011 59
2 t108 11 t002 8 t002 8 t002 8 t108 26 t108 27 t108 26
3 t008 8 t064 5 t019 6 t064 6 t034 4 t567 2 t034 4
4 t002 5 t032 4 t044 5 t179 5 t567 2 t571 2 t899 2
5 t064 3 t044 4 t064 3 t032 4 t899 2 t899 2 t567 2
MUO, Methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) of unknown origin; MKO, MRSA of known 
origin; CC-398, Livestock associated MRSA. Data are from The Netherlands over a two year period 
(2008-2009). The five most prevalent spa-types are shown for the total amount of MRSA, Non-CC398 
and CC-398 distribution. The latter two have a subdivision in MUO and MKO. Rank 1 means first most 
prevalent spa-type, rank 2 means second most prevalent spa-type, etc. Percentages are of group totals 
(mentioned with no.). In total, 403 different spa-types were typed (out of 5565 MRSA).












MUO* MkO* MUO* MkO*
(n = 998) (n = 1407) (n = 352) (n = 1386)
rank % rank % rank % rank % rank % rank % rank %
t032 6 2 4 4 9 2 5 4 - - - - - -
t044 7 2 5 4 4 5 16 2 - - - - - -
t019 8 2 6 3 3 6 14 2 - - - - - -
t179 10 2 8 3 16 1 4 5 - - - - - -
t034 11 1 - - - - - - 3 4 6 1 3 4
t571 28 0.5 - - - - - - 7 1 4 2 8 1
MUO, methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus of unknown origin; MKO MRSA of known origin; CC-
398: Livestock associated MRSA. Spa-types mentioned in table 2 as most prevalent for one group, but 
not found in a top 5 for one of the other groups in table 2, can be compared in this table for its prevalence 
in other groups. Rank 1 means first most prevalent spa-type, rank 2 means second most prevalent 
spa-type, etc. A dash means the spa-type was not present within the specific group. Data is from The 
Netherlands over a two year period (2008-2009). 
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epidemiological characteristics
The following determinants were positively associated with non-CC398 MUO after uni-
variate analysis: age (≤20 years), being a male hospital patient, household (the location 
where the MRSA carrier resided at the time of detection), clinical isolates, three spa-types 
(t008, t019 and t044) and four Dutch provinces, (Table 5) whereas for CC398 MUO, these 
were age (≥65 years), patient, household, clinical isolates (but not blood) and three Dutch 
provinces (Table 5).
The log-binomial regression model, comprised four determinants (PVL, person, 
healthcare centre and source of specimen; Table 5), with an area under the curve of 0.81 
(figure not shown) for non-CC398 and three determinants (source of specimen, age and 
provinces), with an area under the curve of 0.66 (figure not shown). There was no further 
significant effect when adding other determinants to the model. The strongest determinant 
associated with non-CC398 MUO was PVL positivity (RR 1.19; 95% CI 1.11–1.29). For 
CC398 MUO, this was age (20–65 years: RR 0.73; 95% CI 0.59–0.90). In the healthcare 
centre group, the nursing home had a lower risk for MUO in comparison with the other 
group (comprising revalidation centres and various other healthcare institutions) with an 
RR of 0.55 (95% CI 0.42–0.72). For nose, throat and perineum samples, there was a 
lower risk associated with MUO (RR 0.45; 95% CI 0.0–0.74). The risk for a healthcare 
worker to be associated with non-CC398 MUO rather than with non-CC398 MKO was 
greater in comparison with the risk for patients (Table 5).
DiscUssiON
Of the 5545 MRSA isolates registered during 2008 and 2009, 24% were not found by 
targeted surveillance. The Netherlands has a CC398 MUO group (352; 26%) and a non-
CC398 MUO group (998; 74%). The primary conclusion from the regression model was 
that PVL-positive MRSA was more frequent in non-CC398 MUO than MKO (RR 1.19; 
95% CI 1.11–1.29) and that non-CC398 MUO was less likely to come from a nursing 
home than MKO (RR 0.55; 95% CI 0.42–0.72). Only a small portion of the CC398 MUO 
had a described link to animals and was not defined in the risk groups for MKO (50; 
17%). Animals mentioned were bovids, horses and chickens. It remains unclear whether 
there was any relation of these MUO to livestock-related work. It is known that livestock-
associated MRSA CC398 is not only found in pigs, but also in cattle, calf farmers, 
horses, horse personnel, poultry, slaughterhouse personnel and rats 7–12. Remarks on 
the forms indicated that a specific link was not always found. CC398 MUO needs further 
investigation as it could suggest spread through the community not by direct contact 
with livestock. In 2009 Cuny et al. 13 concluded that the dissemination of MRSA CC398 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































familial communities and a low human-to-human transmission was confirmed in several 
studies 14–16. Surveillance will remain necessary to monitor livestock-associated MRSA 
evolution, its spread in the surrounding (innate) environment and to detect new risk fac-
tors or transmission routes. The possibility of increased incidence of livestock-associated 
MRSA, and subsequently of livestock-associated MRSA infections in the future, cannot 
be ruled out. Overall, there was more MUO in Dutch provinces without areas dedicated 
to intensive cattle breeding. Three spa-types in the non-CC398 MUO group, t008 (ST-
8; North America, Europe and Southeast Asia 17,18), t019 (ST-30; North America and 
Southeast Asia 17) and t044 (ST-80; mainly found in Europe 19–21), were found more often 
among MUO than among MKO (Tables 3 and 4). Addition of these three spa-types to the 
regression model of non-CC398 gave no significant effect in the presence of PVL. By 
definition, we do not know where MUO come from. MUO could be community-associated 
MRSA or comprise one or several new risk groups or reservoirs. A possible explanation 
for the PVL correlation with non-CC398 MUO might be found in the association of young 
age (children and young adults) with non-CC398 MUO (Table 5, univariate). The literature 
reports that children and young adults were a risk factor for community-associated MRSA 
infections 22. The CANWARD study described a trend toward younger patient age for 
community-associated MRSA genotypes 23. At first the univariate analysis in this study 
revealed a positive association with young age (≤20 years) as well, but its significant 
effect or trend was lost in the regression model. Another difference between the two 
studies is that this study defined MRSA MUO and MKO epidemiologically. Surprisingly 
the regression model of non-CC398 showed that it was less likely for (non-CC398) MUO 
to come from a nursing home (Table 5) than MKO. Dutch MRSA prevalence in nursing 
homes is still low (<1%) 24, in contrast to nursing homes in other parts of Europe (20%) 
and North America (18.8–35.7%) 25. For nursing homes, the Working party on Infection 
Prevention also applies guidelines for general precautions and in particular to prevent 
MRSA. It is likely that, up to now, the Dutch nursing homes have not served as a source 
for MRSA and, as far as we can conclude from our data, nursing homes are not the source 
of MUO. Previous research has shown that spread of MRSA within households (not a risk 
group in the Working party on Infection Prevention ) was substantial 26. Mollema et al. 
26 showed that the transmission of MRSA from an index person to household contacts 
occurred in nearly half of the cases, and two-thirds of household contacts became MRSA 
positive. Yet in the regression model for non-CC398 the determinant household lost its 
significance. In our Search and Destroy policy, eradication is one of the cornerstones for 
keeping rates low 3,27. If detected MRSA carriers were not offered eradication therapy, this 
would allow further spread, presumably in the household or through other close contacts. 
The early opportunity to eradicate MUO and to interrupt its transmission (according to 
the Search and Destroy policy) is missed, because MUO are not actively cultured for 
the presence of carriage 3,27. Considering the amount of MUO, this would be at least 
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24% of the total MRSA in the Netherlands. It is important to realize that MUO are not 
targeted by the risk groups for active detection and isolation and go unnoticed until they 
are unexpectedly detected from a clinical sample. This explains the significantly higher 
MUO proportion found in clinical specimens, compared with MKO from persons who were 
actively screened. This gives a possible second explanation for the PVL correlation with 
non-CC398 MUO, but also suggests that the unexpected MUO found so far are the tip 
of an iceberg. Exact transmission routes and risk factors for MUO are, for now, obscure, 
although there is an indication that the community is a source of non-CC398 MUO. In 
addition, remarks on the forms for non-CC398 that are returned to the RIVM indicate 
having a foreign origin or having been abroad without having visited a hospital or having 
foreign relatives, which are all in line with studies reporting immigration as a risk factor 
21,28. Although cross-dissemination as a result of past foreign hospital visits, longer than 2 
months before admission to a Dutch hospital, could also play a role 29. The small propor-
tion of CC398 MUO needs further research to see whether community spread indeed 
happens, despite the current dogma of no spread outside the risk population, because 
of person-to-person transmission or spread as a food-borne pathogen 30. In conclusion, 
at least a quarter of the total Dutch MRSA is not from the defined risk groups. Studies on 
new sources and transmissions are urgently needed to possibly update the guidelines 
and to keep the MRSA prevalence low. Furthermore, Search and Destroy policy should 
be evaluated on their defined risk groups and the number of MUO. These are essential 
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abstract
Fifteen percent of all methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) clonal complex 
398 (CC398) human carriers detected in The Netherlands had not been in direct contact 
with pigs or veal calves. To ensure low MRSA prevalence, it is important to investigate the 
likely origin of this MRSA of unknown origin (MUO). Recently, it was shown that CC398 
strains originating from humans and animals differ in the presence of specific mobile 
genetic elements (MGEs). We hypothesized that determining these specific MGEs in 
MUO isolates and comparing them with a set of CC398 isolates of various known origin 
might provide clues to their origin. MUO CC398 isolates were compared to MRSA CC398 
isolates obtained from humans with known risk factors, a MRSA CC398 outbreak isolate, 
livestock associated (LA) MRSA CC398 isolates from pigs, horses, chickens, and veal 
calves, and five methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus (MSSA) CC398 isolates 
of known human origin. All strains were spa-typed, and the presence or absence of, scn, 
chp, φ3 int, φ6 int, φ7 int, rep7, rep27, and cadDX was determined by PCRs. The MRSA 
CC398 in humans, MUO, or MRSA of known origin (MKO) resembled MRSA CC398 
as found in pigs and not MSSA CC398 as found in humans. The distinct human MSSA 
CC398 spa-type, t571, was not present among our MRSA CC398 strains; MRSA CC398 
was tetracycline resistant and carried no φ3 bacteriophage with scn and chp. We showed 
by simple PCR means that human MUO CC398 carriers carried MRSA from livestock 
origin, suggestive of indirect transmission. Although the exact transmission route remains 
unknown, direct human-to-human transmission remains a possibility as well.
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iNtrODUctiON
In The Netherlands, the prevalence of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) is low 1, and Dutch MRSA strains display broad clonal diversity 2. One excep-
tion is the livestock-associated (LA) clone (clonal complex 398 [CC398]), a major clonal 
reservoir in pigs and veal calves 3 and subsequently in people with occupational exposure 
to animals. The reported number of MRSA CC398 strains has been around 40% of MRSA 
strains reported to the Dutch MRSA surveillance since 2008 2, 4. However, only 78% of 
reported CC398 strains are found through screening of patients with direct (occupational) 
contact to pigs or veal calves at hospital admission (a risk factor introduced in 2006) 5. 
The remaining MRSA CC398 carriers do not comply with the described risk factors in the 
Dutch MRSA guideline: industrial contact with live pigs, veal calves, or broiler chickens 
regardless of whether or not this contact was occupational and/or residence of the indi-
vidual on such a farm. Currently 15% (352/2,312) of all Dutch and 15% (24/164) of all 
Danish MRSA CC398 carriers have not been in direct contact with pigs or veal calves 2, 4. 
In The Netherlands, these MRSA CC398 carriers are considered a MRSA of unknown 
origin (MUO) subgroup (MUO CC398), with MUO being any MRSA reported to the MRSA 
surveillance without known risk factors as defined in the Dutch MRSA guideline 4. The 
reservoir or transmission route of MUO CC398 still remains unknown: possible transmis-
sion routes are direct animal-to-human transmission of animal sources not included as 
risk factors in the MRSA guideline (due to being unknown or having a limited effect on the 
population as a whole), indirect animal-to-human transmission through the environment, 
e.g., by dust or air vehicle 6, 7 or animal products such as meat 8, or human-to-human 
transmission 9. Hospital outbreaks of CC398 have been described, illustrating the po-
tential of human-to-human transmission by this clonal complex 10. Although the general 
thought is that long-term colonization of CC398 strains in humans is rare, it was recently 
shown that CC398 strains from animal origin can survive in a human nose for at least 21 
days, suggesting their ability to colonize humans 11. MUO CC398 is therefore an important 
topic, and the necessity to elucidate the origin of MRSA CC398 strains in humans without 
direct contact to pigs or veal calves (MUO CC398) is clear. From the genomic analyses 
on CC398 isolates of different origins, it can be concluded that the origin of CC398 is most 
likely human 12, 13. There are indications that methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus au-
reus (MSSA) CC398 switched hosts in the past as a result of human-animal interactions 
12, 14 and that it adapted to animals by losing several mobile genetic elements (MGEs) 
while gaining other MGEs, including resistance to tetracyclines and methicillin, before 
being reintroduced in humans as MRSA 3, 15. McCarthy et al. showed that CC398 strains 
from humans in contact with animals differed from strains isolated from humans without 
contact with animals. The differences were seen in MGE located genes, e.g., φ3 int, chp, 
scn, rep27, φ7 int, and cadDX for humans and rep7 and φ6 int for pigs, in addition to 
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genes encoding resistance to tetracycline and trimethoprim 14. We therefore hypothesized 
that the presence of these MGE-encoding genes with resistance to tetracycline and 
trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole might be used as a cheap and fast method to compare 
MUO CC398 isolates with isolates from humans (MSSA and MKO CC398) and animals 
(MRSA CC398) to predict the origin of the MUO CC398 in The Netherlands. We showed 
that MUO and MKO isolates resembled CC398 isolates of animal origin more closely 
than those of human origin, indicating that these MUO CC398 isolates most probably 
originated from livestock. (This work was presented in part as a poster at the International 
Symposium on Staphylococci and Staphylococcal Infections (ISSSI), Lyon, France, 2012 
16.)
Materials aND MethODs
bacterial strains and growth conditions. 
In total, 119 isolates were included in the study (Figure 1). All isolates were predicted to 
have a CC398 background, based on multilocus variable-number tandem-repeat analy-






Flowcharts. (Top) Human isolates. MUO is MRSA without known risk factors as described by the Dutch 
national guideline. MKO is MRSA with known risk factors as described by the Dutch national guideline. 
MKO CC398 represents a pig or veal calf farmer, a person with direct contact to pigs and/or veal calves 
and/or who lives on a pig or veal calf farm, or a broiler chicken handler. (Bottom) Animal isolates. RIVM, 
the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, The Netherlands.
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Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), due to costs and also the agreement between 
the results for MLVA and multilocus sequence type (MLST). Only sequence types (STs) 
belonging to the same MLST clonal complex were grouped by MLVA. Furthermore, the 
spa-types associated with MLST clonal complexes show a remarkable agreement with 
those of the MLVA complexes 17. The MLVA complexes were therefore named in ac-
cordance with the MLST complexes. The MLVA complex 398 is thus equal to the MLST 
clonal complex 398. The isolates were all from The Netherlands and from 2009, except 
for an outbreak strain from 2007 and five MSSA isolates from human origin, previously 
described and isolated at the Erasmus MC in the period of 1998-1999 and 2002 13, 18. All 
S. aureus CC398 isolates were stored at -80°C and grown on sheep blood agar plates 
(RBS) (Becton, Dickinson & Co., Belgium) at 37°C overnight.
bacterial strain selection from animals. 
The 80 MRSA strains of animal origin included in this study were previously collected 
from livestock: pigs, n = 24; veal calves, n = 20; chickens, n = 20; and horses, n = 16. 
The pig isolates were from apparently healthy animals and originated from eight different 
farms across The Netherlands that were screened as part of a pilot for a later study by 
Broens et al. 19. The healthy veal calves were sampled at arrival on three Dutch farms 
20. The horse strains were nearly all (94%) samples from diseased horses that visited 
the Utrecht University equine clinic, the remaining 6% being from healthy horses. The 
chicken isolates were obtained from a study in six broiler slaughterhouses, where broilers 
from 40 flocks arriving at the slaughterhouses were sampled in the pharynx after stunning 
21. S. aureus isolates were spa-typed by the RIVM according to the method of Harmsen 
et al. 22. From the available livestock MRSA isolates (n = 459), the largest variability in 
spa-types was chosen (n=80) (Figure 2); whether an isolate was from screening or a 
clinical case was not a selection criterion. This resulted in a selection with both screening 
and clinical isolates.
bacterial strain selection from humans. 
The MRSA strains of human origin included an outbreak strain (n=1), MUO (n=6), and 
MKO (n=27). The outbreak strain reported in 2007 was chosen because it caused nine 
secondary cases (both patients and health care workers) in a single Dutch hospital after 
MRSA was cultured from a diabetic foot ulcer of a patient on a surgical ward 10. Both MUO 
(n=6) and MKO (n=27) were from a previous study, in which an extended questionnaire 
was send to MRSA carriers. Five MSSA isolates were also of human origin. These isolates 
were previously described and isolated at the Erasmus MC in the period of 1998-1999 
and 2002 13, 18.
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extended questionnaire study. 
Around 3,000 MRSA strains have been reported to the Dutch national MRSA surveil-
lance by medical microbiological laboratories from The Netherlands with epidemiological 
data on applicable risk groups 2, 5. Potential MUO carriers reported to the surveillance 
were approached by extended questionnaire. The questionnaire was set up to determine 
the known risk factors for MRSA, as described in the Dutch Working Party on Infection 
Prevention (WIP) guideline on MRSA 4, and also included further questions on risk factors 
as described in the literature, as found by a PubMed search up to 1 January 2010, using 
search keywords “MRSA” and “risk factor” (see supplementary table 1).
S. aureus genotyping, detection of expression of β-hemolysin, and DNA 
isolation. 
After an overnight culture on RBS plates, the hemolysin patterns were determined to de-
tect the expression of β-hemolysin. No expression of β-hemolysin indicates the insertion 
of the φ3 bacteriophage into the bacterial genome, as φ3 inserts on the site that codes for 
β-hemolysin 23.DNA was isolated using a MagNA Pure system (Roche) according to the 
protocol supplied by the manufacturer.
Mobile genetic elements. 
The presence or absence of MGEs was determined by PCRs specific for cadDX, φ3 int, 
scn, chp, rep7, rep27, φ6 int, and φ7 int 14, 23, 24. Primers for φ3 int (forward primer, TCC 
GGCTTCTTTGAAAATGT; reverse primer, CCGGAAAACCTACGA AGTCA; amplicon 
size, 220 to 323 bp; annealing temperature, 50°C) and cadDX (forward primer, TGATGT-
GATCTGTGTACATGAGGA; reverse primer, TGATGTGAAGTTGAAGCAACA; amplicon 
size, 207 bp; annealing temperature, 60°C) were designed with Primer3 software (http://
frodo.wi.mit.edu/). All amplified PCR products were visualized by agarose gel (1.2%) 
electrophoresis (see supplementary tables 2 and 3).
antimicrobial susceptibility. 
To determine the antimicrobial susceptibility of S. aureus strains, the standard disc dif-
fusion method was applied using Oxoid antimicrobial susceptibility test discs (Thermo 
Fisher Scientific, Waltham, MA, USA) on Mueller-Hinton (MH) agar plates. The Clinical 
and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) breakpoints were used for tetracycline (zone 
diameter breakpoints: susceptible [S], ≥19 mm; intermediate [I], 15 to 18mm; resistant 
[R], ≤14mm)and trimethoprimsulfamethoxazole (zone diameter breakpoints: S, ≥16 mm, 
I, 11 to 15 mm; R, ≤10 mm) 25.
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statistical analysis. 
Statistical analysis was performed with SAS Enterprise Guide software (version 4.2; SAS 
Institute, Inc., NC, USA) using 2x2 tables and Fisher’s exact test. P values of <0.01 were 
considered significant to correct for multiple testing. A comparison was made between 
animal and human hosts and between human epidemiological subgroups. Isolates 
were clustered transversally, using the Jaccard coefficient, on the presence of MGEs, 
β-hemolysin expression, and susceptibility to tetracycline and trimethoprim-sulfamethox-
azole. The dendrogram was created based on unweighted-pair group method using 
average linkages (UPGMA) with Jaccard similarity.
resUlts
A total of 277 suspected MUO carriers from all of The Netherlands were approached by 
an extended questionnaire; 42% (116) responded and 33 were defined as CC398 carri-
ers. Of these 33 CC398 strains, 6 were MUO (CC398), and these were confirmed to have 
had no contact with pigs, veal calves, or (broiler) chickens in the year before questioning. 
The MUO CC398 carriers were found to reside in the Dutch province Noord Brabant, 
figure 2
Selected spa-types for human and animal groups. MKO, MRSA of known origin (known risk factors 
described in the Dutch MRSA guideline); MSSA, methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus; MUO, 
MRSA of unknown origin (unknown risk factors not described in the Dutch MRSA guideline). The out-
break isolate was described by Wulf et al. 9.
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where there is generally more pig farming. All MUO and MKO CC398 strains were dis-
tinctly diff erent from human MSSA CC398 strains based not only on spa-type, but also 
on β-hemolysin expression, tetracycline resistance, and the lack of φ3 int, scn, and chp 
genes. The human MRSA CC398 strains resembled animal MRSA CC398 strains (Figure 
3). The presence of cadDX and rep27, which are considered human-associated genetic 
markers as they are highly prevalent in human MSSA and signifi cantly less prevalent in 
animal MRSA 14, were absent in the MUO strains and few in the MKO strains: cadDX, 0/6 
for MUO and 9/27 for MKO; and rep27, 0/6 for MUO and 4/27 for MKO. In horse and pig 
isolates, cadDX was almost absent, while in veal calf and chicken isolates, cadDX was 
found frequently: 16/20 (80%) for veal calves and 12/20 (60%) for chickens. rep27 was 
absent in horse and veal calf isolates and only incidentally found in chickens and pigs: 
8% (2/24) for pigs and 20% (4/20) for chickens. All 119 isolates of both MRSA and MSSA 
were similar in their full susceptibility to trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole. Also, there was 
no signifi cant diff erence between the MUO and MKO strains in rep7, rep27, φ6 int, and 
cadDX content, resulting In MUO and MKO strains clustering together, despite some 
minor diff erences in MGE content.
When the combined data for MUO and MKO isolates were compared to data for the 
animal isolates, it was clear that the human isolates were less often φ6 int positive than 
the MRSA isolates from veal calves or horses (P <0.01), more often rep7 positive than the 
isolates from horses (P<0.01), more often rep27 positive than the isolates from pigs (P 
<0.01), and less often cadDX positive than the isolates from veal calves and chickens (P 
<0.01). No signifi cant diff erences between the MRSA isolates from the human subgroups 
(MUO, MKO, and outbreak) were found for rep27. Interestingly, the hospital outbreak 
strain lacked any previously mentioned human- or pig-associated markers (rep7, rep27, 
φ3, φ6 int, and cadDX) but displayed tetracycline resistance. MGE variation within a 
single spa-type was observed for human and animal isolates (Figure 3).
DiscUssiON
The human MRSA CC398 isolates (MUO and MKO) in this study resembled animal MRSA 
CC398 isolates more than they resembled human MSSA CC398 isolates, because they 
were β-hemolysin producers and tetracycline resistant, had similar MGE patterns, and 
had spa-types similar to those found in animals. Furthermore, our MUO isolates almost 
always clustered together with MKO isolates in cluster analysis. The similarity between 
MUO CC398, MKO CC398, and animal MRSA CC398 strains suggests that these MUO 
CC398 strains belong to the same MRSA clade originating in animals and that these 
MUO CC398 strains are not part of the MSSA CC398 clade detected in humans. Stegger 




Results of β-hemolysin screening, 
PCR typing, and susceptibility test-
ing. Isolates were clustered transver-
sally, using the Jaccard coefficient, on 
the presence of MGEs, β-hemolysin 
expression, and susceptibility to 
tetracycline and trimethoprim-sulfa-
methoxazole. The dendrogram was 
created based on UPGMA with Jac-
card similarity. The epidemiological 
subtypes in humans are MKO (MRSA 
of known origin: MRSA with known 
risk factors for acquisition) and MUO 
(MRSA of unknown origin: MRSA with 
unknown risk factors for acquisition). 
MUO 2007 are MUO isolates accord-
ing to the 2007 guideline definition but 
no longer included under the 2012 
guideline definition. MUO 2012 are 
MUO isolates according to the current 
guideline of December 2012. Out-
break represents an isolate involved 
from a MRSA CC398 outbreak in a 
Dutch hospital as described by Wulf 
et al. 9. Mobile genetic elements: chp 
(gene encoding chemotaxis-inhibiting 
protein[CHIPS], which is found in the 
φ3 bacteriophage that contains the 
immune evasion complex [IEC] that 
chp is sometimes part of); scn (gene 
encoding staphylococcal comple-
ment inhibitor SCIN], which is found 
in the φ3 bacteriophage that contains 
the IEC that scn is sometimes part 
of); φ3int (integrase gene of bacte-
riophage 3); φ6int (integrase gene 
of bacteriophage 6); φ7int (integrase 
gene of bacteriophage 7);rep7 (rep-
lication protein 7); rep27 (replication 
protein 27); and cadDX (operon of 
gene cadX [cad operon regulatory 
protein], which encodes resistance 
against the heavy metal cadmium). 
Antimicrobial susceptibility: tetra-




et al. found two distinct phylogenetic clades based on single nucleotide polymorphisms 
(SNPs), revealing a basal human clade and a more derived livestock clade 26. Although 
no whole-genome sequencing or SNP analysis was done, the outcome of our cheaper 
and quicker MGE-based method strongly suggests that these MUOCC398 strains belong 
to the livestock clade with MKO CC398 and MRSA CC398 from animals and not to the 
MSSA CC398 clade found in humans. The lack of risk factors in our MUO CC398 carriers 
suggests spread of animal MRSA CC398 strains by means other than those currently 
described in the MRSA guideline.
The exact mode of transmission remains unknown. An indirect route of transmission is the 
most likely mode of transmission for these MUO CC398 strains, taking into consideration 
where these MUO CC398 carriers live, their lack of contact with pigs and veal calves, 
and also their lack of contact with horses and chickens. Since living in areas with a high 
density of pigs 6 and private farm visits 27 were risk factors for livestock-associated MRSA 
carriage, modes of indirect transmission are most likely through contamination of areas 
in which people live and interact. Considering the survival of S. aureus bacteria in the 
environment and subsequent spread by air over large distances 7, transmission by air 
is a possibility 28, as well as transmission by vectors such as rodents 29. Nevertheless, 
transmission by human-to-human contact cannot be ruled out: of the six MUO CC398 
carriers investigated by extended questionnaire in this study, one MUO CC398 carrier 
had had contact with a MRSA carrier (who or which MRSA type was unknown) outside the 
family or household, while another had visited a farm without contact to animals. Neither 
is currently considered an at risk event. In the Dutch guideline, MRSA-positive household 
members are considered a risk, but contact in the community outside the household or 
hospital is not.
We know that a pig MRSA CC398 lacking φ3 can survive up until 21 days in a human 
nose 11, whereas φ3 is currently considered to be the marker for human host adaptation 12. 
The successful outbreak isolate reported by Wulf et al. 10 lacked φ3 as well. Human host 
adaptation is explained by more than φ3 alone, or host adaptation might not have to be 
as extensive to facilitate transmission. In regard to the outbreak isolate, further research 
is necessary to determine what makes this outbreak isolate so different and successful 
compared to other human MRSA isolates. Despite no significant difference between MUO 
and MKO for MGE-encoding genes, there were slight differences observed for cadDX 
and rep7 between the MUO and MKO. Furthermore, rep7-positive isolates were as com-
mon in MKO as in animal strains, unlike MUO, which showed significantly less rep7 than 
among pig strains (P <0.01). rep7 and rep27 genes are typical of small plasmids carrying 
resistance genes, and rep7 is reported to be associated with the tetracycline resistance 
gene, tetK 30. We also observed MGE variation within single spa-types within humans or 
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animals, as can best be seen in t011 and t108, fitting the known relative stability of MGE 
31. As for the limitations of this study, we do not know whether our isolates were obtained 
from persistent MRSA carriers or transient carriers (contaminated humans). Follow-up 
data are important to better understand host adaptation, but since this was a retrospec-
tive study, carrier data over time was unfortunately not available. This study’s strength is 
the questionnaire that allowed discrimination between MRSA CC398 carriers with and 
without known risk factors, regardless of guideline changes. The number of MUO CC398 
carriers in this study are few as 28% (33/116) of respondents were CC398 carriers, and 
only 21% (6/33) fit the MUO definition. However, the number of MUO CC398 isolates 
per year in The Netherlands is just over 5%, which means on average an additional 150 
Dutch people with a MRSA CC398 strain while lacking the risk factors as described in the 
Dutch MRSA guideline 4. We showed by simple PCR means that the MUO CC398 carriers 
in this study carry MRSA CC398 strains of livestock origin. This finding is suggestive of an 
indirect transmission route, possibly the environment (air or water) or through fomites, but 
we cannot rule out direct human-to-human transmission. Although, the reported numbers 
of MUO CC398 strains in The Netherlands are currently still small, the problem may 
increase, giving rise to more CC398 transmission and human host adaptation.
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supplementary table 1 – additional risk factors after literature search
The following risk factors were added to the questionnaire in addition to the risk factors described in the WIP 
guideline on MRSA (2012).
· Activities deployed in relation to water (frequent beach, lake visits, frequent use of saunas or whirlpools)
· Animal contact (livestock species, household animals and other; which animals, where and how many 
animals)
· Antibiotic use (< or > 6 months)
· Broken skin barrier (eczema, tattooing, other)
· Comorbidity (CF, HIV, COPD, etc.)
· Crowding and close contact situations (households, material sharing such as bedding, pillows and towels)
· Drug abuse
· Ethnicity (Adoption, immigration)
· Hospital residence or visit
· Hospital residence or visit abroad (> 2 months ago)
· Long care term facility residence or visit
· Meat consumption (Vegetarian or not)
· Occupation (livestock related or not; specified which job and whether currently active or not)
· Sports (contact, group, individual; specified which sport)
supplementary table 2 – Primers for mobile genetic elements
gene # sequence base pairs
chp 1 TTTACTTTTGAACCGTTTCCTAC 365
2 CGTCCTGAATTCTTAGTATGCATATTCATTAG
scn 1 AGCACAAGCTTGCCAACATCG 259
2 TTAATATTTACTTTTTAGTGC
φ3 int 1 TCCGGCTTCTTTGAAAATGT 220-323
2 CCGGAAAACCTACGAAGTCA
φ6 int 1 CCT TGA ATT GAT GGC GAT TT 202
2 TTG CTG GGG CTG TAG AAG TT
φ7 int 1 TTCTGGCGCTTCCCTTTAAT 509
2 AACACAGTCAAGCATACGCCT
rep7 1 GCACTGCGGATAGAGCAATA 168
2 GCAATTGTTTTTCGTTCGCT
rep27 1 TTCGGTTGGATCAATTTCTTT 619
2 TTTTGTCCTGTCTGTGCTTGG
cadDX 1 TGATGTGATCTGTGTACATGAGGA 207
2 TGATGTGAAGTTGAAGCAACA
Numbers 1 and 2 are forward and backward primer respectively. Base pair product size on the right of 
the table. Primers for chp and scn obtained from W. van Wamel. Primers for φ6 int, φ7 int, rep7 and 
rep27 from J. Lindsey and A. McCarthy. Primers for φ3 int and cadDX were made with primer3 software 
(http://frodo.wi.mit.edu/).
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supplementary table 3 – Pcr programs
gene 
Pcr program
t (ºc) time (s) t (ºc) time (s) t (ºc) time (s) t (ºc) time (s) t (ºc) time (s)
chp 94 240 94 30
1 cycle 30 cycles 1 cycle
scn 94 240 94 30 50 30 72 60 72 120
1 cycle 30 cycles 1 cycle
φ3 int 94 300 94 15 50 30 72 60 72 120
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
φ6 int 95 120 95 15 62 15 72 30 72 600
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
φ7 int 95 120 95 15 62 15 72 30 72 600
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
rep7 95 120 95 15 62 15 72 30 72 600
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
rep27 95 120 95 15 60 15 72 30 72 600
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
cadDX 94 300 92 30 60 15 72 30 72 600
1 cycle 35 cycles 1 cycle
T is temperature in degrees Celsius. Time is in seconds. Cycles are the number of repeats of time and 
temperature instructions. The table is read from left to right. 
46 Chapter 3
refereNces
 1. Bode LG, Wertheim HF, Kluytmans JA, Bogaers-Hofman D, Vandenbroucke-Grauls CM, 
Roosendaal R, Troelstra A, Box AT, Voss A, van Belkum A, Verbrugh HA, Vos MC. 2011. 
Sustained low prevalence of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus upon admission 
to hospital in The Netherlands. J Hosp Infect 79:198–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
jhin.2011.05.009.
 2. Lekkerkerk WS, van de Sande- Bruinsma N, van der Sande MA, Tjon ATA, Groenheide A, 
Haenen A, Timen A, van den Broek PJ, van Wamel WJ, de Neeling AJ, Richardus JH, Ver-
brugh HA, Vos MC. 2012. Emergence of MRSA of unknown origin in the Netherlands. Clin 
Microbiol Infect 18: 656–661. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1469- 0691.2011.03662.x.
 3. Cuny C, Friedrich A, Kozytska S, Layer F, Nubel U, Ohlsen K, Strommenger B, Walther B, 
Wieler L, Witte W. 2010. Emergence of methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
in different animal species. Int J Med Microbiol 300: 109–117. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijmm.2009.11.002.
 4. Werkgroep Infectie Preventie (WIP). 2012. WIP guideline MRSA. Werkgroep Infectiepreven-
tie. http: //www.rivm.nl/Documenten_ en_ publicaties/Professioneel_ Praktisch/Richtlijnen/In-
fectieziekten/WIP_ Richtlijnen/Actuele_ WIP_ Richtlijnen/Ziekenhuizen/WIP_ richtlijn_ MRSA_ 
ZKH.
 5. Haenen A, Pluister CN, van Luit M, Bosch T, Heck MEOC, de Greeff S, Neeling AJ, et al. 2012. 
Surveillance of MRSA in The Netherlands in 2011, p 198–203. In Infectieziekten Bulletin, vol 
23, no 7. Netherlands National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven, 
The Netherlands. (In Dutch.) http: //www.rivm.nl/dsresource?objectid_ rivmp: 185877&type_ 
org&disposition_ inline&ns_ nc_ 1.
 6. Feingold BJ, Silbergeld EK, Curriero FC, van Cleef BA, Heck ME, Kluytmans JA. 2012. 
Livestock density as risk factor for livestock- associated methicillin- resistant Staphylococ-
cus aureus, the Netherlands. Emerg Infect Dis 18: 1841–1849. http: //dx.doi.org/10.3201/
eid1811.111850.
 7. Schulz J, Friese A, Klees S, Tenhagen BA, Fetsch A, Rosler U, Hartung J. 2012. Longitu-
dinal study of the contaminantion of air and of soil surfaces in the vicinity of pig barns by 
livestock- associated methicillinresistant Staphylococcus aureus. Appl Environ Microbiol 78: 
5666–5671. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1128/AEM.00550- 12.
 8. Buyukcangaz E, Velasco V, Sherwood JS, Stepan RM, Koslofsky RJ, Logue CM. 2013. Mo-
lecular typing of Staphylococcus aureus and methicillin- resistant S. aureus (MRSA) isolated 
from animals and retail meat in North Dakota, United States. Foodborne Pathog Dis 10: 
608–617. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1089/fpd.2012.1427.
 9. Cuny C, Kock R, Witte W. 2013. Livestock associated MRSA (LA- MRSA) and its relevance 
for humans in Germany. Int J Med Microbiol 303: 331–337. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
ijmm.2013.02.010.
 10. Wulf MW, Markestein A, van der Linden FT, Voss A, Klaassen C, Verduin CM. 2008. First out-
break of methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus ST398 in a Dutch hospital, June 2007. 
Euro Surveill 13(9): pii_ 8051. http: //www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId_ 
8051.
 11. Slingerland BC, Tavakol M, McCarthy AJ, Lindsay JA, Snijders SV, Wagenaar JA, van Belkum 
A, Vos MC, Verbrugh HA, van Wamel WJ. 2012. Survival of Staphylococcus aureus ST398 
What is the origin of LA-MRSA CC398 isolates from humans without livestock contact 47
in the human nose after artificial inoculation. PLoS One 7: e48896. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0048896.
 12. Price LB, Stegger M, Hasman H, Aziz M, Larsen J, Andersen PS, Pearson T, Waters AE, 
Foster JT, Schupp J, Gillece J, Driebe E, Liu CM, Springer B, Zdovc I, Battisti A, Franco 
A, Zmudzki J, Schwarz S, Butaye P, Jouy E, Pomba C, Porrero MC, Ruimy R, Smith TC, 
Robinson DA, Weese JS, Arriola CS, Yu F, Laurent F, Keim P, Skov R, Aarestrup FM. 2012. 
Staphylococcus aureus CC398: host adaptation and emergence of methicillin resistance in 
livestock. mBio 3(1): e00305–11. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1128/mBio.00305- 11.
 13. van Belkum A, Melles DC, Peeters JK, van Leeuwen WB, van Duijkeren E, Huijsdens XW, 
Spalburg E, de Neeling AJ, Verbrugh HA, Dutch Working Party on Surveillance and Research 
of MRSA- SOM. 2008. Methicillin- resistant and - susceptible Staphylococcus aureus sequence 
type 398 in pigs and humans. Emerg Infect Dis 14: 479–483. http: //dx.doi.org/10.3201/
eid1403.070760.
 14. McCarthy AJ, van Wamel W, Vandendriessche S, Larsen J, Denis O, Garcia- Graells C, 
Uhlemann AC, Lowy FD, Skov R, Lindsay JA. 2012. Staphylococcus aureus CC398 clade 
associated with human- to- human transmission. Appl Environ Microbiol 78: 8845–8848. http: //
dx.doi.org/10.1128/AEM.02398- 12.
 15. Huijsdens XW, van Dijke BJ, Spalburg E, van Santen- Verheuvel MG, Heck ME, Pluister GN, 
Voss A, Wannet WJ, de Neeling AJ. 2006. Community- acquired MRSA and pig- farming. Ann 
Clin Microbiol Antimicrob 5: 26. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1186/1476- 0711- 5- 26. 16. 2012 Poster no. 
P 12–157. 15th International Symposium on Staphylococci and Staphylococcal Infections 
[ISSSI], Lyon, France, 26 to 30 August 2012.
 17. Schouls LM, Spalburg EC, van Luit M, Huijsdens XW, Pluister GN, van Santen- Verheuvel 
MG, van der Heide HG, Grundmann H, Heck ME, de Neeling AJ. 2009. Multiple- locus vari-
able number tandem repeat analysis of Staphylococcus aureus: comparison with pulsed- field 
gel electrophoresis and spatyping. PLoS One 4: e5082. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0005082.
 18. van Wamel WJ, Hansenova Manaskova S, Fluit AC, Verbrugh H, de Neeling AJ, van Duijkeren 
E, van Belkum A. 2010. Short term microevolution and PCR- detection of methicillin- resistant 
and –susceptible Staphylococcus aureus sequence type 398. Eur J Clin Microbiol Infect Dis 
29: 119–122. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10096- 009- 0816- 3.
 19. Broens EM, Graat EA, Van der Wolf PJ, Van de Giessen AW, De Jong MC. 2011. Prevalence 
and risk factor analysis of livestock associated MRSA- positive pig herds in The Netherlands. 
Prev Vet Med 102: 41–49. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2011.06.005.
 20. Graveland H, Wagenaar JA, Verstappen KM, Oosting- van Schothorst I, Heederik DJ, Bos 
ME. 2012. Dynamics of MRSA carriage in veal calves: a longitudinal field study. Prev Vet Med 
107: 180–186. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.06.006.
 21. Mulders MN, Haenen AP, Geenen PL, Vesseur PC, Poldervaart ES, Bosch T, Huijsdens XW, 
Hengeveld PD, Dam- Deisz WD, Graat EA, Mevius D, Voss A, Van De Giessen AW. 2010. 
Prevalence of livestock associated MRSA in broiler flocks and risk factors for slaughterhouse 
personnel in The Netherlands. Epidemiol Infect 138: 743–755. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0950268810000075.
 22. Harmsen D, Claus H, Witte W, Rothganger J, Turnwald D, Vogel U. 2003. Typing of methicil-
lin- resistant Staphylococcus aureus in a university hospital setting by using novel software for 
spa repeat determination and database management. J Clin Microbiol 41: 5442–5448. http: //
dx.doi.org/10.1128/JCM.41.12.5442- 5448.2003.
48 Chapter 3
 23. van Wamel WJ, Rooijakkers SH, Ruyken M, van Kessel KP, van Strijp JA. 2006. The innate 
immune modulators staphylococcal complement inhibitor and chemotaxis inhibitory protein 
of Staphylococcus aureus are located on beta- hemolysin- converting bacteriophages. J Bac-
teriol 188: 1310–1315. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1128/JB.188.4.1310- 1315.2006.
 24. McCarthy AJ, Witney AA, Gould KA, Moodley A, Guardabassi L, Voss A, Denis O, Broens 
EM, Hinds J, Lindsay JA. 2011. The distribution of mobile genetic elements (MGEs) in MRSA 
CC398 is associated with both host and country. Genome Biol Evol 3: 1164–1174. http: //
dx.doi.org/10.1093/gbe/evr092.
 25. Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute. 2012. Performance standards for antimicrobial 
susceptibility testing; 22rd informational supplement. Clinical and Laboratory Standards Insti-
tute, Wayne, PA.
 26. Stegger M, Liu CM, Larsen J, Soldanova K, Aziz M, Contente- Cuomo T, Petersen A, Van-
dendriessche S, Jimenez JN, Mammina C, van Belkum A, Salmenlinna S, Laurent F, Skov 
RL, Larsen AR, Andersen PS, Price LB. 2013. Rapid differentiation between livestock- associ-
ated and livestock- independent Staphylococcus aureus CC398 clades. PLoS One 8: e79645. 
http: //dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0079645.
 27. Bisdorff B, Scholholter JL, Claussen K, Pulz M, Nowak D, Radon K. 2012. MRSA- ST398 in 
livestock farmers and neighbouring residents in a rural area in Germany. Epidemiol Infect 
140: 1800–1808. http: //dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0950268811002378.
 28. Uhlemann AC, Knox J, Miller M, Hafer C, Vasquez G, Ryan M, Vavagiakis P, Shi Q, Lowy FD. 
2011. The environment as an unrecognized reservoir for community- associated methicillin 
resistant Staphylococcus aureus USA300: a case- control study. PLoS One 6: e22407. http: //
dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0022407.
 29. Himsworth CG, Miller RR, Montoya V, Hoang L, Romney MG, Al- Rawahi GN, Kerr T, Jardine 
CM, Patrick DM, Tang P, Weese JS. 2014. Carriage of methicillin- resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus by wild urban Norway rats (Rattus norvegicus). PLoS One 9: e87983. http: //dx.doi.
org/10.1371/journal.pone.0087983.
 30. McCarthy AJ, Lindsay JA. 2012. The distribution of plasmids that carry virulence and resis-
tance genes in Staphylococcus aureus is lineage associated. BMC Microbiol 12: 104. http: //
dx.doi.org/10.1186/1471- 2180- 12- 104.
 31. Lindsay JA, Knight GM, Budd EL, McCarthy AJ. 2012. Shuffling of mobile genetic elements 
(MGEs) in successful healthcare- associated MRSA (HA- MRSA). Mob Genet Elements 2: 
239–243. http: //dx.doi.org/10.4161/mge.22085.
Follow-up cultures for MRSA after eradication therapy 494
Follow-up cultures for MRSA after eradication 







the Journal of infection, January 2015
50 Chapter 4
sUMMary 
Objectives: We compared the standard procedure of three MRSA follow-up culture-sets 
to six to determine the number of recurrences detected between the third and sixth follow-
up culture-set, and studied possible risk factors for MRSA recurrence.
Methods: A retrospective carrier cohort (2005-2010) was studied. Data was collected on 
MRSA culture-sets, follow-up, risk factors and outcome (recurrences during follow-up). 
We compared outcome between three and six follow-up MRSA culture-sets, between 
HCWs and patients groups for complicated or uncomplicated carriers, and between nose-
throat carriers and other carriers.
Results: Of 406 MRSA carriers, 179 had received eradication therapy and had a negative 
first follow-up MRSA culture-set. Between the third and sixth follow-up culture-set 54% 
(35/65) of total recurrences occurred. Over 88% of all recurrences were detected within 
two months. Combined nose and throat carriage (OR 25.5 (1.6-419.1)) and intravascular 
lines (OR 13.6 (1.2-156.2)) were risk factors for early recurrence.
Conclusions: We recommend five culture-sets till one year after successful eradication 
therapy with a distinction between those at risk for early recurrence and HCWs who 
require frequent culturing in the beginning and those not at risk for early recurrence. This 
recommendation is a balance between the need for swift detection of MRSA recurrence 
and the patients’ burden.
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iNtrODUctiON
The Netherlands is one of the few countries in the world with a low meticillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) prevalence. This is most likely due to a rigourous control 
strategy, which includes decolonization treatment of MRSA carriers and their household 
members.1 Decolonization treatment of MRSA carriers (MRSA eradication therapy) is a 
worldwide used strategy, but consensus and/or documentation on follow-up to determine 
MRSA clearance (successful MRSA decolonization after MRSA eradication therapy) 
varies per region or nation, or is even absent.2 In The Netherlands, the current national 
guideline to prevent MRSA in healthcare centres (Working Party on Infection Prevention 
(WIP) guideline on MRSA3), recommends the use of three follow-up culture-sets to prove 
successful decolonization after eradication therapy. To the best of our knowledge, the only 
data reported on this issue, is a study from our research group in 2010 by Mollema et 
al., who studied 165 MRSA-positive individuals in a prospective observational follow-up 
study. This study concluded for a reliable assessment of successful MRSA eradication 
(>90%) at least five negative culture-sets would be required.4 However the study did not 
address when the follow-up culture-sets should be collected after eradication therapy; nor 
the number of recurrences that would have been missed between the third and the sixth 
follow-up culture set; nor any risk factors for early or late recurrence. Although the Dutch 
national MRSA guideline suggests a minimum of three sets after eradication therapy is 
considered sufficient (with at least seven days between each set) at the Erasmus Medical 
Centre six culture-sets are routinely collected post MRSA eradication therapy. Therefore, 
we have data to compare the two approaches of three and six follow-up culture-sets.
In this study we determined the number of recurrences of MRSA detected between 
the third and sixth follow-up culture-sets after eradication therapy, and identified any risk 
factors associated with MRSA recurrence, and whether the risk factors were associated 
with early (first three follow-up culture-sets) or late (follow-up culture-sets four, five and 
six) MRSA recurrence.
PatieNts aND MethODs
i - carriers and follow up
A retrospective cohort (2005-2010) of carriers (patients and healthcare workers (HCWs)) 
was studied. Carriers were retrospectively selected from reports on the MRSA carrier 
population that visited or worked at the Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam (Erasmus 
MC). All carriers, who had received MRSA eradication therapy and whose first culture-set 
after treatment was negative, were included in our routine follow-up procedure. Eradica-
tion therapy was described by Mollema et al. and derived from the Dutch guideline on the 
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treatment of MRSA carriage.1,4 A follow-up culture-set comprised a culture of the nose, 
throat, perineum and, if present, wounds. Specimen collection was performed by self-
collection by the carriers after receiving written instructions, by their general practitioner 
or in the hospital. Exclusion criteria were loss to follow-up, or incomplete data or reports. 
(Figure 1) A complete follow-up period was defined as the time period between the nega-
tive results of the first follow-up culture-set after eradication therapy and the sixth follow-up 
culture-set, or earlier in case of MRSA recurrence. The major outcome of this study was 
either recurrence, defined as growth of MRSA with the same spa-type as before eradica-
tion therapy, at any screened site or successful eradication defined as no growth of MRSA 
at all screened sites at the end of a complete follow-up period. For each patient, data were 
collected on recurrence or successful eradication, number of culture-sets taken, follow-up 
period and data to analyse whether carriers were complicated or uncomplicated carriers, 
as defined by the guideline of the Dutch Working Party on Antibiotic Policy.1 Furthermore, 
we analysed the outcome in defined subgroups, such as patients, health care workers, 





























figure 1 – flowchart
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carriers. Between 2005 and 2007 the microbiological method to detect MRSA was similar 
as described previously by Vos et al.5 After 2007, an additional step was included. Swabs 
of newly suspected MRSA carriers that had been inoculated on phenol red mannitol 
enrichment broth were incubated for 24 h at 35°C, after which they were put in a PCR 
pool. If the PCR pool result was negative, this information was passed on to infection 
prevention team and the broth incubated for another 24 h, followed by subculture on a 
blood agar plate as usual. With a positive PCR pool result, PCR was redone for each 
individual isolate, followed by a subculture on blood agar plate for the positive isolate, 
as opposed to waiting another 24 h. Sampling was deemed improper if the number of 
colony forming units on the initial blood agar plate, incubated at the same time as the 
phenol enrichment broth, was under fifteen. Statistical analyses were performed with SAS 
Enterprise Guide 4.2 and included descriptive analyses, multiple regression and Kaplan 
Meier survival curves with Mantel-Cox test.
ii - risk factors for outcome
By using search terms in Pubmed (MRSA combined with one or more of the following 
search terms: drug effects, treatment failure, treatment outcome, anti-bacterial agents, 
therapeutic use, recurrence, risk factors, factors, determinants), risk factors for MRSA 
recurrence were extracted from the literature and selected for our analysis. Out of 56 
original abstracts, ten remained based on relevance. One study was excluded because it 
described a risk factor (household infection) not obtainable from our hospital’s electronic 
medical record system. Risk factors for recurrence were defined at start of eradication 
therapy and included sex, age,6 complicated MRSA carriage,6-8 presence of artificial 
devices,8,9 presence of drains,8 artificial ventilation,10 presence of intravascular lines,8 use 
of immunosuppressives11 and presence of an underlying disease (presence of anatomi-
cal abnormality, auto-immune disease, cardiovascular disease, cerebrovascular disease, 
congenital disease, gastro-enteric disease, iatrogenic, infectious disease, neoplasm, 
psychiatric disease or traumatic events).7-10,12-14 Furthermore, we added risk factors for 
acquisition of MRSA based on the Dutch (WIP) guideline on MRSA (MRSA of Known 
Origin/MRSA of Unknown Origin)15 and risk factors described in literature: total duration 
of hospitalization,10 Barthel index (Activities of Daily Living scale),7 use of antibiotics (12 
months prior to start eradication therapy),10 drug abuse and the presence of Panton-
Valentine leukocidin (PVL) in the carriage strain. Data on these risk factors were col-
lected from the electronic medical record system. Risk factors with 50% or more missing 
values were omitted from statistical analysis. Statistical analysis was performed with SAS 
Enterprise Guide 4.2 using c2 and Fisher exact test. A p-value of <0.05 was considered 




i - carriers and follow up
Four hundred and six MRSA carriers were detected during the inclusion period of which 
179 received eradication therapy and had a negative first follow-up culture-set (Figure 
1), and were therefore included in the study (HCWs: n= 26, patients: n=153). The mean 
age of the study population was 32 years and 94 were male (52.5%; 94/179). Between 
the second and sixth set 36% (65/179) of participants showed a recurrence of MRSA car-
riage. Median period between the first negative culture-set (considered initially successful 
eradication therapy) and the occurrence of recurrence for the second, third, fourth, fifth 
or sixth culture-set, was 7, 14, 24, 38 and 49 days respectively (Table 1). Cumulative non 
MRSA recurrence at three sets was 0.88, and at six sets 0.71 (Figure 2). The difference 
(0.88-0.71) equalled 35 recurrences, which is 54% (35/65) of total recurrences during 
follow-up (Table 1, Figure 2). The median number of days to detect a recurrence was 24 
(range 4-185 days; IQR 14-42). The first 2 months (61 days) of follow-up, 88% (57/65) of 
recurrences were detected. The remaining 12% was detected between 62 and 200 days 
(one at the second culture set, one at the third culture set, two at the fourth, three at the 
fifth culture set and one at the sixth culture set). All recurrences in HCWs were detected 
within 61 days. For all 153 patients, 55 showed recurrences with eight occurring after 
two months (15%; 8/55). Complicated carriers were 50% (13/26) of all HCWs and 83% 
(127/153) of all patients. There was insufficient data for 17 patients (two with recurrence) 
to conclude whether they were complicated or uncomplicated carriers (Figure 3). Recur-
rence in the subgroups was 1/9 (11%) for uncomplicated patient carriers, 52/127 (41%) 
for complicated patient carriers, 4/13 (31%) for uncomplicated HCWs and 6/13 (46%) 
for complicated HCWs. There were no significant differences for the patient, HCW and 
complicated carrier subgroups (log-rank, p = 0.3371, Wilcoxon p = 0.3343). The recur-
table 1 – follow-up culture-sets after Mrsa eradication therapy
culture set #
Days from the end of eradication therapy 
until the culture set was taken Number of 
recurrences a
Mrsa negative 
persons leftrange Median Mean
1b - - - - 179
2 (4-128) 7 22 11 168
3 (8-77) 14 21 19 149
4 (16-200) 24 40 16 133
5 (27-185) 38 70 8 125
6 (36-117) 49 60 11 114
a The number of MRSA recurrences during follow-up after MRSA eradication therapy.
b If positive at culture set #1, there has not been a successful eradication therapy in the first place. 
Therefore, all persons in this study were negative in the first culture set.
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rence in the uncomplicated patient carrier subgroup was at 24 days. For combined nose 
throat carriers, recurrence was 17/31 (55%), in all other carriers recurrence was 38/116 
(33%) (log-rank, p = 0.01. Wilcoxon p = 0.009). There was missing data for 27 carriers (26 





figure 2 – follow-up culture-sets after Mrsa eradication therapy and detection of Mrsa recur-
rence. 
At day 0, all cases had completed their MRSA eradication therapy and had once tested negative for 
MRSA (first follow-up culture-set). The data was censored at 200 days, leaving a cumulative non MRSA 
recurrence of 0.64 for the remaining 114 cases (successfully decolonized as determined with six culture-
sets). The median number of days at which the second, third, fourth, fifth or sixth culture-sets was taken, 




figure 3 – subgroup analysis of hcWs, patients, complicated carriers and combined nose throat 
carriers. 
A: There was insufficient data for 17 patients to conclude whether they were complicated or uncompli-
cated carriers. Complicated/uncomplicated MRSA carriage definitions were according to the guideline 
of the Dutch Working Party on Antibiotic Policy.1 There were no significant differences between the 
subgroups (log-rank, p = 0.3015, Wilcoxon p = 0.2543). B: There was a significant difference between 
combined nose throat carriers and other carriers (log-rank, p = 0.01, Wilcoxon p = 0.008).
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ii - risk factors for outcome
For the 150 patients the average age was 31 years, 85 were male (56.7%; 86/150), 
and 31.3% were MUO (MRSA of Unknown Origin; no presence of described risk factors 
from the Dutch national guideline)15 and 86% (129/150) were complicated MRSA carriers. 
Combined nose and throat carriage was a risk factor for early recurrence in multiple 
regression analysis (p = 0.02, OR 25.5 (1.6-419.1)), as was the presence of intravascular 
lines (p = 0.04, OR 13.6 (1.2-156.2)). Interestingly, ventilation at detection was a protec-
tive factor for recurrence itself in univariate and multiple regression (p = 0.02, OR 0.016 
(0.03-0.75)), while age under 30 was a protective factor for early recurrence in multiple 
regression analysis (p = 0.04, OR 0.07 (0.01-0.85)). The backward elimination models for 
recurrence had a R2 of 0.11, with an area under the ROC curve (AUC) of 0.6170, and 
for early recurrence the R2 was 0.42, with an AUC of 0.8210. The univariate and multiple 
regression results for the analysis of risk factors are given in Table 2.
DiscUssiON
Using six follow-up culture-sets, 88% of MRSA recurrences were identified within two 
months of follow up (after eradication therapy and one negative culture set). In con-
trast, using three culture-sets only 46% (30/65) of MRSA recurrences were identified. 
These results question the current recommendation by the Dutch national guideline, as 
pre-emptive declaration of successful decolonization may result in transmission within 
healthcare centres or in the community. To detect a recurrence, a test with a high negative 
predictive value (NPV) is required. Current PCR MRSA assays and chromogenic agars 
have very high NPV (between 99.1 and 99.5),16 so the chance for a false negative out-
come when screening for MRSA recurrence is small. A single swab at two months could 
detect the majority of the recurrences with a sufficient NPV. However, quick detection 
of a recurrence is desirable as it allows the carrier to readily receive repeat eradication 
therapy and prevents MRSA transmission. Especially in the household of the recurrent 
carrier, the chance of (re-)transmission of the strain to household members will be re-
duced. Also, in the healthcare setting, isolation measures would be continued thereby 
preventing transmission. The right balance between the number of culture-sets taken 
and the patient’s burden needs to be found. We therefore recommend that carriers with 
risk factors for early recurrence are more frequently cultured at the start of follow-up, and 
we advise the same for HCWs because the duration of the follow-up has a strong impact 
on when they can start working again. In line with Mollema et al.4 we recommend five 
culture-sets after the initial culture-set taken to confirm success of eradication therapy. 
Treated carriers at risk for early recurrence and HCWs should be cultured three times 
during the first month, then once more at two and six months after completion of MRSA 
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eradication therapy. For all others we recommend two culture-sets during the first month, 
followed by a culture-sets at 2 and 6 months, and finally the last culture-set at 1 year after 
eradication therapy ended (Figure 4).
figure 4 – recommendations for follow-up culture-sets. 
HCWs: Healthcare workers. HCWs follow-up is similar to early recurrence risk patients for fast recovery 
of personnel.
As risk factors for recurrence, we found colonization of the nose in combination with the 
throat, as well as presence of intravascular lines. The high risk on recurrence in nose-
throat carriers cannot be explained by treatment failure due to the sole use of topical 
antibiotics, since MRSA eradication therapy for complicated carriers consisted of two oral 
antibiotics in addition to nasal ointment of mupirocin and chlorhexidin wash for skin and 
hair. Ventilation was protective for recurrence, however, we did not understand this find-
ing. Possibly this is a confounder for other, unknown determinants, or it is related to the 
amount of antibiotics ventilated patients receive. We found that ventilated patient carriers 
received more antibiotics (p < 0.01), had more drains (p < 0.01) and artificial devices 
(p < 0.01), but both ventilated as non-ventilated carriers were similar in age, combined 
nose throat carriage or complicated carriage composition. Limitations of this study were 
its retrospective design, the use of data from a single hospital, and the omission of risk 
factors due to missing data. Furthermore, in our patient population 86% were complicated 
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carriers, due to colonization on other sites than the nose only and/or the presence of 
active skin lesions or medical artificial devices. This is higher than the 54% reported 
before in a national study.7 Our data showed that a regime of three follow-up cultures 
was not sufficient, and would have missed 54% (35/65) of total recurrences, which is in 
line with the previously recommended minimum of five culture-sets by Mollema et al.4 
Since culture-sets were not always taken with equal time intervals, we calculated the 
median number of days that each culture-set was collected from start of follow up, using 
the median number of days to determine the number of recurrences for each culture-set.
Although small group sizes were inevitable due to the low prevalence in The Neth-
erlands (0.11% at hospital admission17), current group sizes are the result of six years 
of patient data (2005-2010). To our knowledge, these data are the only available data 
worldwide specifically addressing the question on the required number of culture-sets 
during follow-up after eradication therapy to establish success of eradication. Our recom-
mendation is a five culture-set scheme up till one year after successful eradication therapy 
with a distinction between those at risk for early recurrence and HCWs who require more 
frequent culturing in the beginning and those not at risk for early recurrence. The reason 
to still culture at half or one year is to catch the last remnants of recurring MRSA after 
two months as cost-effective as possible. This recommendation is a balance between the 
need for swift detection of recurrence and the patients’ burden. Nevertheless, it remains 
most important that household members of the carrier are also screened and if necessary 
treated to prevent recurrence due to household transmission.18
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We applaud the successful implementation of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus 
(MRSA) screening programme on the German side of the Dutch–German border region 
(EUREGIO) 1. The described strategy is based on the risk-based admission screening 
approach 1. From our experience with ‘search and destroy’ (S and D) in the Netherlands, 
we learned that it is essential to evaluate and timely enlarge risk categories when epide-
miology changes to prevent MRSA of unknown origin (MUO), i.e. not fitting any defined 
risk factors 2. Herewith, we report our recent finding of a previously unrecognised risk 
group for MRSA: seafarers. In 2010, we noticed that clinical cultures with unexpected 
MRSA in the Harbour Hospital (Port of Rotterdam, the Netherlands) were mainly from 
seafarers. Although the Harbour Hospital is especially equipped for seafarers, this patient 
population only accounts for 1.2% of all admissions 3. Since seafarers are not considered 
an MRSA risk group, all seafarer patients were screened (nose and throat) at the Emer-
gency Department of the Harbour Hospital in a six month prospective surveillance (2011). 
Perineum and wounds were screened additionally, if active infection or skin lesions were 
present. Detection of MRSA was performed as previously described 4, and spa-typing 
was done at the reference laboratory of the National Institute for Public Health and the 
Environment (RIVM) 5. Furthermore, since the hospital is visited by a large number of 
seafarers, a case–control study was designed to identify risk factors for MRSA carriage 
among seafarers, in order to identify specific risk factors within this putative new risk 
group. Cases were defined as seafarers with a positive MRSA culture of any site, whereas 
controls had a negative MRSA culture. Data on demographics, medical history, laboratory 
and naval parameters were collected retrospectively. Data were then analysed by univari-
ate (chisquared, Fisher’s exact test) and multivariate analysis (logistic regression model).
In the study period 124 seafarers (men, 22–51 years of age) were included. Four seafarer 
patients had an unknown MRSA status and were excluded. MRSA prevalence among 
seafarers was 5.8% (95% confidence interval (CI): 4.6–7.1) and the incidence rate was 
24.8/1,000 seafarer population. Seven MRSA-positive seafarers were identified as cases, 
leaving 113 MRSA negative seafarers as controls. Of seven MRSA carriers, four had 
wounds, of which three were cultured MRSA positive as well. Furthermore, of seven 
MRSA strains, five had similar spa-repeat successions: t019 (twice),
t122, t975 and t4557. The remaining two were t4845 and t9231. Nationality was only 
known for 32 seafarers.
Twenty-five of them were of Asian origin, with 18 seafarers from the Philippines. Of MRSA 
carriers, nationality was known in two cases: the Philippines and India. Severe missing 
data for many proposed variables forced us to exclude many variables, as registration of 
seafarers was basic due to swift departure and communication difficulties. The remain-
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ing risk factors are listed in the Table. Presence of wounds or abscesses was the only 
significant risk factor (p<0.01) in both univariate
analysis and multivariate regression analysis (odds ratio (OR): 40.8 (95% CI: 5.9–
278.3)). The multivariate regression model was based on forward selection with ‘presence 
of wounds or abscesses’, ‘detection of pus’ and ‘C-reactive protein (CRP)’ (area under 
the receiver operator characteristic criterion (AUC): 0.75, R2max: 0.4603). The positive 
predictive value for finding an MRSA carrier when a seafarer had a wound was 44% 
whereas the negative predictive value (MRSA carrier when a seafarer has no wound) was 
2%. The MRSA carriage did not influence the duration of hospitalization of the seafarers 
(p=0.36). In our limited sample of 124 seafarers, the 5.8% MRSA prevalence detected is 
52-times higher than the normal prevalence in the Netherlands (0.11% at hospital admis-
sion) 4, and the presence of wounds or abscesses gave a 40-times higher risk of being 
MRSA positive. Some bias might play a role due to our screening procedure. However, 
this choice was made due to communication difficulties and cultural differences. Given 
the high prevalence rate of carriage among seafarers, we recommend that all seafarers 
should be screened for MRSA in the Netherlands, regardless of wounds or underlying 
disease, and to apply pre-emptive isolation while awaiting test results, and should be 
taken into consideration as risk group by other European nations. Further studies are 
necessary to understand the impact of global transmission of MRSA clones by seafarers.








n(%) P-value Odds ratio (95% ci)
Male sex 7 (100) 112 (99) - -
Specialist involved with patient
Internal medicine 2 (29) 21 (19) 0.61 -
Surgery 5 (71) 59 (52) 0.45 -
Physical examination
Presence of wounds or 
abscesses
4 (57) 5 (4) < 0.01 40.8 
(5.9-278.3)
Pus detected 2 (28) 2 (2) 0.01 26.7 
(2.9-241.3)
CI: confidence interval; OR: odds ratio. 
Presence of wounds or abscesses was the only risk factor (p<0.01) in univariate analysis and in the 
multiple regression model with an OR of 40.8 (95%CI: 5.9–278.3). The multiple regression model was 
based on forward selection with ‘presence of wounds or abscesses’, ‘detection of pus’ and ‘C-reactive 
protein (CRP)’ (area under the receiver operator characteristic criterion (AUC): 0.75, R2max: 0.4603).
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To elucidate new risk factors for MRSA carriers without known risk factors (MRSA of un-
known origin; MUO). These MUO carriers are neither pre-emptively screened nor isolated 
as normally dictated by the Dutch Search & Destroy policy, thus resulting in policy failure.
Methods
We performed a prospective case control study to determine risk factors for MUO acquisi-
tion/carriage (Dutch Trial Register: NTR2041). Cases were MUO carriers reported by 
participating medical microbiological laboratories to the RIVM from September 1st 2011 
until September 1st 2013. Controls were randomly selected from the community during 
this period.
results
Significant risk factors for MUO in logistic multivariate analysis were antibiotic use in the 
last twelve months, aOR 8.1 (5.6−11.7), screened as contact in a contact tracing but not 
detected as a MRSA carrier at that time, aOR 4.3 (2.1−8.8), having at least one foreign 
parent, aOR 2.4 (1.4−3.9) and receiving ambulatory care, aOR 2.3 (1.4−3.7). Our found 
risk factors explained 83% of the MUO carriage.
conclusions
Identifying new risk factors for MRSA carriers remains crucial for countries that apply 
a targeted screening approach as a Search and Destroy policy or as vertical infection 
prevention measure.
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iNtrODUctiON
In The Netherlands MRSA prevalence is low, measured at 0.12% at hospital admission in 
2005−20071 and 0.8% in Dutch outpatients in the Dutch-German border region in 2012.2 
Among S.aureus blood-cultures the MRSA prevalence was 1.0% (24/2,386).3 To keep 
MRSA prevalence low, prudent use of antibiotics is instigated and a Search and Destroy 
policy (S&D) is in place. S&D consists of screening of defined risk patients (Table 1) at 
hospital admission, and by pre-emptive isolation of them pending the screening results.4 
Colonized patients and healthcare workers are treated with strict treatment regimens to 
eradicate the carriage of MRSA. 4 One of the revisions on MRSA risk groups, was due to 
the discovery of livestock-associated MRSA with sequence type 398 (LA-MRSA ST398) in 
The Netherlands.5 The risk groups for S&D were subsequently updated with pig and veal 
calf farmers. In 2016, LA-MRSA accounted for 26% (892/3,478) of MRSA isolates.3 Apart 
from the discovery of LA-MRSA, it appeared that the proportion of reported MRSA without 
known risk factors, thus not defined as risk patients, became substantial. In 2008−2009, 
25% (1350/5545) of all MRSA were reported as MRSA without known risk factors 6 In 
2016, this has increased to 38% (810/2,121). 3 The MRSA without known risk factors 
were named MRSA of Unknown Origin or MUO. MUO are per definition unexpected and 
are mostly detected in clinical samples. However, in screening samples on MRSA, MUO 
can be detected as well. This is the case when the found MRSA genotype does not match 
the MRSA genotype of the index person.6 We started a nation-wide study to explore 
the risks and causes of MUO, so the defined risk groups in S&D policy can be updated 
and unnoticed dissemination of MRSA in healthcare settings and the community can be 
stopped. In this paper, we report the results from our prospective case control study to 
determine the risk factors for carriage of MUO.
MethODs
Mrsa surveillance
In the Netherlands, all MRSA are detected either through active surveillance screening 
or in a clinical sample and are mandatorily sent to the Dutch National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (RIVM). Yearly, around 3,000 isolates are submitted to the 
RIVM.7 Along with the isolate, risk factors for MRSA carriage, as defined in the MRSA 
guideline by the Dutch Working party on Infection Prevention (WIP), are reported to the 
RIVM by standard questionnaire.8, 9 Any person detected with MRSA and reported with 
one or more risk factors as described in this WIP guideline is defined as MRSA of Known 
Origin (MKO). Any person detected with MRSA lacking these risk factors, is defined as 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A trawling questionnaire was forwarded by Dutch Medical Microbiological Laboratories 
(MML) in 2010 to all MUO carriers reported to the RIVM in 2009. The retrospective trawling 
questionnaire was set-up to learn which risk factors could be involved with MUO to narrow 
and specify the number and kind of questions in the case control questionnaire, as well to 
choose the best control group for the case control study. To prevent recall bias, the maxi-
mum timespan for events in the past that had to be recalled by trawling study participants 
was limited to two years. To confirm that these MUO carriers were not misclassified MKO 
carriers, the questionnaire included questions on the described risk factors for MRSA in 
the Dutch WIP guideline on MRSA (Table 1). Furthermore, the questionnaire included 
questions on occupations, sports, leisure, social habits and lifestyles, and risk factors in 
other populations described in the literature. (PubMed at 01-01-2010, search keywords 
`MRSA’ and `risk factor’). Excluded cases were non-responders, the deceased, potential 
cases that lacked an address or were misclassified as MKO for various reasons. Included 
cases were all MUO carriers not misclassified as MKO upon return of the questionnaire. 
Questionnaire data was analysed as described under `statistics’, and the results were 
interpreted to update the questionnaire and define the best controls. 
case control study
Study population
The study population consisted of patients detected with MRSA but without known risk 
factors (MUO) and population controls. The sample site and frequency of detection was 
not taken into account. In the Netherlands, persons detected with MRSA are all included 
in the national MRSA database, regardless of sample site, infection or indication for 
sampling. To determine the risk factors for MUO, we approached cases and controls 
with questionnaires (Supplementary list 1). Case control study participants who answered 
≥95% questions of the total of 43 questions and of whom informed consent was obtained, 
were rewarded with 25 euros and enrolled as case or control. To detect an odds ratio (OR) 
of 2 or higher with 80% power and an alpha of 0.05, we aimed to enrol 500 cases and 
1,000 controls (1:2 case-control ratio), based on an estimated 700 MUO reported to the 
MRSA surveillance in two years (on a total of ±3,000 MRSA carriers reported per year).
Case definition
Potential cases were MRSA carriers, reported by the participating MML (medical microbi-
ologist or infection prevention personnel) as MUO to the RIVM for the MRSA surveillance 
from September 1st, 2011 until September 1st, 2013. Before sending the questionnaire, 
assumed MUO cases were checked on the following exclusion criteria: death, lack of 
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address or misclassification (of a MKO as a MUO). Upon return of the questionnaire, we 
checked once more for misclassification. True MUO were included as case.
Control definition
Selecting the right controls was based on the results from the trawling study (see results 
below). The best control group was considered to be unmatched community controls. 
This choice was based on the fact that the MUO were selected from the RIVM database, 
which contained not only MRSA carriers detected at hospitals, but also those detected 
by general practitioners or in long-term care facilities. Furthermore, MUO carriers were 
shown to be a diverse group of carriers. The controls were randomly chosen from 60 
Dutch municipalities from all over of The Netherlands. These 60 municipalities were a 
national representative subset of all 415 municipalities in The Netherlands, and contained 
large, middle and small municipalities.
Inclusion procedure
Every two weeks a printout was made in Microsoft Excel of the newly reported MUO 
to the RIVM. Questionnaires for MUO carriers were sent to participating MML (Supple-
mentary table 1). The MML checked the carriers on exclusion criteria before forwarding 
the questionnaires to the MUO carriers. After three weeks, non-responders were once 
again approached by questionnaire or by telephone. Returned questionnaires of both 
cases and controls were checked to exclude any MKO carriers misclassified as MUO. 
Misclassifications were not included as cases. Controls were sent a questionnaire by 
mail. After three weeks non-responders were approached once more by mail or if possible 
by telephone. This study was approved by the medical ethical committee at the Erasmus 
MC and registered in the Dutch Trial Register under NTR2041. Written informed consent 
was requested from both cases as controls, before participating in this study by question-
naire. Data were aggregated and anonymized before analysis. 
Statistics
Questionnaire data were analysed with SAS Enterprise Guide (version 4.2 by SAS Institute 
Inc., North Carolina, USA), using descriptive, univariate (2x2 tables and Fisher’s Exact 
test) and multivariate analysis (multiple regression logit model, backward elimination with 




Of the reported 794 MUO to the MRSA surveillance, only 277 fulfilled inclusion criteria 
and could be approached by questionnaire through participating MML (Figure 1). Of these 
37% (104/277) responded and all age groups were present. Of the 104 returned question-
naires, 22 were MKO, and thus misclassified as MUO and the remaining 82 were MUO.
Fifty-two percent (43/82) of MUO carriers were male and none of the MUO were health-
care workers. Sixty-six percent (54/82) of MUO were patients detected in the hospital. 
However the other MUO carriers were detected by general practitioners or community-
based healthcare institutions other than hospitals.
case control study
Between September 1st 2011 and September 1st 2013 1,455 MUO were reported to the 
RIVM and 767 MUO were approached by questionnaire (Figure 1). The response rate 
among cases was 49% (376/767), that of controls 33% (667/2,000). Of the 376 returned 
questionnaires, 38% (144/376) of cases turned out to be MKO, thus misclassified as 







figure 1 – flowcharts for trawling and case control studies.
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Comparing 232 cases with 667 controls, some risk factors, such as hospitalization of a 
household member, chronic disease, and carriage of ST398 MRSA without professional 
contact with pigs/veal calves or other farm animals, were significant in univariate analy-
sis, but not in the final regression model (Table 2). Significant factors in the multivariate 
logistic regression model were antibiotic use in the last twelve months aOR 8.1 (95%CI 
5.6−11.7), screened as contact in a contact tracing but not detected as a MRSA car-
rier at the time aOR 4.3 (95%CI 2.1−8.8), having at least one foreign parent aOR 2.4 
(95%CI 1.4−3.9), and receiving ambulatory care aOR 2.3 (95%CI 1.4−3.7). The most 
frequently used antibiotics by cases and controls were β-Lactam-antibiotics. There was 
no significant difference (p = 0.9) between cases and controls for β-Lactam-antibiotics 
use in general, although there was a significant (OR 5.7; 95%CI 1.4−23.1) difference for 
the use of Amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (13.2% among cases (7/53) versus 2.6% (3/116) 
among controls). Among ambulatory care use, home care was the most common, and 
MUO carriers were significantly more exposed (OR 3.3; 95%CI 1.5−6.9) to it. Eighty-three 
percent of all MUO could be explained by the found independent risk factors in multiple 
regression model. (Table 3).





(n=667) p-value aOra 95%ci
ST398 but without professional contact with pigs/
veal calves or other farm animals*
18 0 n.s. 1.8 (0.6-5.2)
Hospitalization within householdb 84 157 n.s. 1.1 (0.7-1.7)
Chronic disease2 85 135 n.s. 1.4 (0.9-2.0)
Antibiotic use in last 12 months 150 139 < 0.01 8.1 (5.6-11.7)
Screened as part of a contact tracing but not found 
to be a MRSA carrier at the time
24 23 < 0.01 4.3 (2.1-8.8)
At least one foreign parent 48 71 < 0.01 2.4 (1.4-3.9)
Ambulatory care received 55 66 < 0.01 2.2 (1.4-3.7)
aOR: adjusted Odds Ratios; CI: Confidence Interval; 
* before 2012 only professional contact to pigs/veal calves was a risk factor. After 2012 any contact to 
pigs, veal calves and broiler chickens became a risk factor. But presence on a farm is not a risk factor 
per se, unless at the farm they have pigs, veal calves or broiler chickens.
aLogistic regression model with backward elimination containing the following factors: no professional 
contact with pigs/veal calves or other farm animals, antibiotic use in the preceding 12 months, chronic 
disease, not detected with contact tracing, at least one foreign parent, hospitalization within the house-
hold and ambulatory care. The R2max of the model was 0.29, while the AUC was 0.79. 




We identified the following independent risk factors for MUO: antibiotic use in the preced-
ing 12 months, receiving ambulatory care, and being screened for MRSA in contact tracing 
but not having been detected at the time. Travelling abroad was not a risk factor, although 
we found a significant association with having a foreign parent. In literature, antibiotic 
use in the last twelve months has been described before as risk factor for the general 
population; as a risk factor for MRSA carriage in children 10, 11, and within households 
where carriers were present 12. Also, a systematic review showed a association between 
antibiotic exposure to quinolones, glycopeptides, cefalosporins and beta-lactams and an 
increased risk of MRSA isolation in adults.13, 14 These former findings were confirmed by 
our study, as we found a significant difference in amoxicillin/clavulanic acid use between 
cases and controls. Greater use of amoxicillin/clavulanic acid may be due to more infec-
tions among MUO carriers compared to the controls. We cannot rule out this possibility 
as we did not measure the number of infections among MUO, since submission of an 
infection isolate to the MRSA database is preferred but not obliged. The Netherlands has 




All cases with the risk factor:
Antibiotic use in the last 12 months 150 (64.7)
Screened as part of a contact tracing but not found to be a MRSA carrier at the time 24 (10.3)
At least one foreign parent 48 (20.7)
Ambulatory care received 55 (23.7)
Number of cases that only have this one risk factor
Antibiotic use in the last 12 months 52 (22.4)
Screened as part of a contact tracing but not found to be a MRSA carrier at the time 5 (2.2)
At least one foreign parent 8 (3.4)
Ambulatory care received 6 (2.6)
Number of cases that only have one risk factor 71 (30.6)
Number of cases with a combination of 2 or more of the above risk factors 121 (52.2)
Total cases of MUO explained by these risk factors 192 (82.8)
Remaining unexplained MUO 40 (17.2)
MUO carriers had a single risk factor in 30.6% (71/232) and had in 52.2% multiple risk factors. Among 
those MUO with a single significant risk factor, antibiotic use in last twelve months accounted for 22.4%, 
at least one foreign parent for 3.4%, ambulatory care received for 2.6%, and screened as part of a con-
tact tracing but not found to be a MRSA carrier at the time for 2.2%.
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the lowest use of all antibiotics in the European Union. In 2013, 2015 and 2017, it was 
10.8, 10.7 and 10.4 defined daily doses/1000 inhabitants/day respectively.3, 15
Interestingly, having been screened as part of a contact tracing in the past, but not 
detected at that time, was a significant risk factor for MUO carriage. This is an important 
risk factor for countries with S&D policy, as this policy aims to identify all people at risk, 
including contacts. Explanations for this risk factor could be a too low sensitivity of MRSA 
culture, missing sampling sites, or when sampling occurs too early after exposure, and 
is not follow-upped with repeated sampling. For this reason it is also recommended to 
sample healthcare workers on start of their next duty instead of immediately after unpro-
tected contact with a MRSA carrier. The current guideline indicates one set of samples 
from nose, throat, rectum and wounds when present. The guidelines assumes a sampling 
frequency of one set to be sufficient. There are no indications in the guideline on the 
timing of sampling of contacts after exposure when tracing MRSA contacts. Indeed, in 
our previous study we showed that carriage is not always detectable in each sample 
moment when sampling after MRSA eradication therapy to monitor MRSA recurrence.16 
Further studies on reliability of contact tracing should be conducted, especially in regards 
to the number and sample sites of cultures when screening for contacts. Having at least 
one foreign parent, was also one of the significant risk factors. Possibly, an immigra-
tion background from countries with a higher MRSA prevalence may result in a higher 
exposure to MRSA by visiting or close contact within the family. Especially those countries 
with higher levels of CA-MRSA. This is in line with findings from Denmark which showed 
40% of affected individuals CA-MRSA infections with certain CA-MRSA clones had a 
positive family history related to foreign regions where such clones were predominant. 17 
Furthermore, the MRSA prevalence among actively screened asylum seekers (refugees/
immigrants) in The Netherlands was 9.7% (87/898). 18 Similar to findings in Germany, but 
much higher than the prevalence in the general population at hospital admission.18, 19 In 
2015, the RIVM added as risk factor a refugee visiting a Dutch hospital who had been in 
a refugee camp less than two months before (category 2/3).20 It is possible that a limited 
understanding of the Dutch language prevented refugees from participating. If this is the 
case then our aOR for having at least one foreign parent, is an underestimation. Our 
national MRSA database currently contains spa, MLVA and PVL data. But this typing 
data, along with scarce epidemiological data, is currently not sufficient to link MUO to out-
breaks abroad or transmission or sources occurring outside a Dutch health care centre. 
Furthermore, in this study we did not analyse the typing data, including PVL. As we did so 
in a previous study, and learned that PVL positive MRSA isolates were significantly larger 
among MUO than among MKO.6
Ambulant or home care exposure are scarcely published in literature as risk factor 
for MRSA carriage, as only ambulatory care facilities in Germany were described and 
designated as a reservoir for dissemination.21 Theoretically, transmission of MRSA 
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through ambulatory care could be possible, thus creating new MUO carriers. This finding 
necessitates further investigation in the future in The Netherlands, as ambulatory care 
facilities are becoming more important in a population with a growing segment of the 
elderly. The use of arbitrary cut-offs in risk factor definitions could theoretically result in 
MUO. However, after multivariate analysis we found no significant risk factors related to 
arbitrary cut-offs in risk factor definitions, such as `less than two months ago’ in case of a 
visit to a hospital abroad.
We could not confirm poultry consumption or scuba gear sharing as risk factors as 
found in the study by van Reijen et al.22 Possible explanations for the difference could be 
due to design, different selection and inclusion criteria of cases and controls, difference 
in questioning, and the number and selection of participating MML. Continuous analyses 
of MUO and its risk factors in the future will be necessary, not only to measure the effect 
of new policy implementation, but also to elucidate differences in outcome between stud-
ies. Two risk factors published in recent years, fine air particles for Cystic Fibrosis (CF) 
patients and livestock-density for livestock-associated MRSA, were not included in our 
case control questionnaire.23, 24 However, we think the impact of the absence of these risk 
factors in the questionnaire is minimal.
The use of standardized questionnaires, representative nationwide participation and 
community controls were study strengths which allows us to generalize results for all 
MUO in The Netherlands. Due to low national MRSA prevalence at hospital entry,1 the 
odds of including MRSA carriers among the controls were very low. The confines of the 
MRSA surveillance database, the lack of exact data on infection/carriage, the necessity 
to contact and possible recall bias were limitations of our study. We aimed to enrol 500 
cases and 1,000 controls based on an estimation of 700 MUO per two years to detect 
odds ratios of two or higher with 80% power. Inclusion of MUO was more difficult due to 
misclassification of some MUO and a lower willingness to participate in the study than 
expected. We therefore ended up including 232 cases and 667 controls, which was still 
enough to detect OR of 2 or higher with an 80% power and an alpha of 0.05, due to a 
larger number of controls per case. In the trawling questionnaire study, as well as in the 
case control study, we found there was misclassification of MKO as MUO, inflating the 
number of MUO in the MRSA surveillance. In the future, more effort is needed to detect 
the presence of risk factor before classifying a carrier as MUO, and thus registration of 
MKO or MUO in the RIVM database should be improved to reduce the number of misclas-
sified MUO. Currently, 38% of total reported MRSA are reported as MUO3, 7, underlining 
its significance. Even after correction for misclassification, MUO is estimated to be a 
fourth of total MRSA reported to the surveillance each year.
Some of the newly defined risk factors, such as antibiotic use, can be common (Table 
2) and would have low specificity when included into S&D risk groups. Other risk factors, 
such as being part of contact tracing in the past, could result in changes to the national 
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guideline in regards to sampling frequency and timing. To determine the probability of 
MRSA carriage more precisely in the future, the known risk factors (current ones in the 
WIP guideline and from this study) should be analysed by creating risk tables or an 
algorithm. The presence of a single or combined risk factors could thus lead to targeted 
action such as screening or screening in combination with isolation on admission. Such a 
probability analysis could be subject of a next study.
For countries that apply a S&D approach as vertical infection prevention approach, 
MUO identification and elucidation is important. In a targeted screening approach as in 
S&D, persons at risk for MRSA carriage are identified (targeted) by means of risk fac-
tors. Monitoring MRSA is necessary to evaluate the effect of policy adjustments and any 
epidemiological changes that may give rise to new risk factors. Antibiotic use in the pre-
ceding 12 months, receiving ambulatory care and having at least one foreign parent, are 
common risk factors with limited practicality, but could still prove useful when combined 
to determine the probability of MRSA carriage risk based on a risk table and algorithm. In 
conclusion, risk factors for MUO were mainly healthcare related despite MUO carriers not 
always being hospital-associated. Our new risk factors elucidated 83% of MUO, bringing 
us a step closer to preventing MUO from undermining successful S&D policy.25
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University Medical Center, Maastricht, Medical Center Alkmaar, Alkmaar, Medical Center 
Leeuwarden, Izore Center for Infectious Diseases Friesland, Leeuwarden, Orbis Medi-
cal Center, Sittard-Geleen, Regional Public Health Laboratory Kennemerland, Haarlem, 
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Reinier de Graaf Groep, Delft, Rijnland Hospital, Leiderdorp, Rijnstate Hospital, Arnhem, 
SALTRO, Utrecht, SHL-group, Etten-Leur, Slingeland Hospital, Doetinchem, St. Antonius 
Hospital, Nieuwegein, St. Franciscus Gasthuis, Rotterdam, St. Jans Gasthuis, Weert, 
St. Jansdal Hospital, Harderwijk, Tergooi Hospitals Hilversum, Hilversum, UMC Utrecht, 
Utrecht, University Medical Center Groningen, Groningen, VieCuri Medical Center, Venlo, 
Vlietland Hospital, Schiedam, Westfries Gasthuis, Hoorn, Ziekenhuis Zeeuws- Vlaan-
deren, Terneuzen, Zuwe Hofpoort Hospital, Woerden, The Netherlands. This study was 
financed by ZonMw (125020010) and listed in the Dutch Trial Register (NTR2041). Data 
were presented at the International Symposium on Staphylococci and Staphylococcal 
infections 2016, Seoul, South Korea. Poster S01-02.
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sUPPleMeNtary list 1  
case cONtrOl qUestiONNaire
0. Date of filling out the questionnaire
general 
1. What is your sex?
2. What is your birthdate?
3. What is your postal code? (4 out of 6 charac-
ters)
4. a. What is your country of birth?
 b.  If you were born outside the Netherlands, 
were you adopted?
5. In which country were your parents born?
6. a. Did you move the last two years?
 b.  If yes, what was your previous postal code? 
(4 out of 6 characters)
7. What is your sexual preference?
8. In your household, are you the one who regu-
larly cooks?
9. Do you wash your hands when preparing the 
food?
10. a. Are you vegetarian?
 b. If no, do you eat raw meat?
11.  Do you visit one of the following locations? 
(Swimming pool, beach/sea, river/lake, sauna, 
whirlpool, pedicure, beauty salon)
12. Did you have a tattoo or piercing in the last 
twelve months?
household
13. How many people are in your household?
14. Which of the following objects do you regularly 
share among your household members? (tow-
els, wash cloths, bedsheets, shaving razors, 
toothbrushes, combs, creams, other, none)
15. Was someone in your household hospitalized 
the last year?
Mrsa 
16. a. Have you ever been MRSA positive?
 b. In the last twelve months?
 c. Do you know the exact period?
 d.  Who detected the MRSA? (Hospital, long 
term care facility, general practitioner, other)
17. a.  Have you ever been treated against MRSA 
with an ‘eradication therapy’?
 b. Did this get rid of the MRSA?
 c.  During eradication therapy, were your 
household members screened?
 d. Were they also treated?
 
general health
18. a. Do you sport?
 b.  What type of sport? (team, individual, 
contact, with animals)
 19. Do you smoke?
20. a. Do you dialyze?
 b. If so, have you been dialyzed abroad?
21. a.  Do you know if you have/had contact with 
a MRSA carrier?
 b.  If so, where did you have contact with this 
MRSA carrier?
 c. If elsewhere, where exactly?
 d.  What was your relation compared to this 
MRSA carrier?
 e.  Do you have close contact with certain 
people? (inside the household, outside 
or with people from inside and outside the 
household)
22. a.  Have you ever been contacted in regards to 
contact tracing for another MRSA carrier?
 b. Were you then found to be MRSA positive?
23. a.  Did you use antibiotics in the last twelve 
months?
 b. If so, how often and when?
 c. If so, do you remember the names?
24. a.  Do you have a skin disease diagnosed by 
a doctor?
 b. If so, is this eczema?
25. a. Do you have a chronic disease?
 b.  If so, to which group does your chronic 
disease belong? (lungs, cardiac/heart, 
auto-immune, other metabolic, diabetes, 
chronic infection, congenital, other, don’t 
know)
 c.  Do you happen to know the name of your 
chronic disease?
 d.  Do you use immunosuppressive medica-
tions?
 e.  If so, do you remember the names of these 
medications?
26. a.  Did you receive ambulant care the last 
two years?
 b. If so, how often?
 c.  If so, which kind? (homecare, general 
practitioner, mental healthcare, obstetric 
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care, maternity, supervised living, physio-
therapy, dispensary, other)
27. Did you visit an outpatient department of a 
Dutch hospital in the last twelve months?
28. Were you admitted to a Dutch hospital or 
nursing home in the last twelve months?
29. Were you care for on a department in a Dutch 
hospital or nursing home in the last twelve months 
where there was a known MRSA outbreak?
30. Did you come into contact with a MRSA carrier 
in a Dutch hospital or nursing home?
Work
31. Which situation applies to you? (Employed, 
retired, standing entrepreneur, student, jobless, 
going to school, volunteer job, <4 years old)
32. In which sector do/did you work? (Healthcare, 
animals, shipping, other)
33. In which sector does/did your partner work? 
(healthcare, animals, shipping, other)
34. In which sector does/did your household mem-
bers work? (healthcare, animals, shipping, other)
Following questions only for those working 
in healthcare
35. a.  Have you come into contact with a MRSA 
carrier?
 b.  Did you take infection prevention precau-
tions?
 c.  Was MRSA detected at you after you had 
contact with a MRSA carrier?
36. Did you accompany patients in the last twelve 
months when they were transferred from a 
hospital abroad to one in the Netherlands? 
(Or the other way around)
animal contact
37. a.  Did you have contact with pigs or veal 
calves outside your work?
 b. If yes, with pigs, veal calves or both?
 c.  Where did you come into contact with 
these animals?
38. a.  Did you partner or one of your household 
members come into contact with pigs or 
veal calves outside work?
 b.  If yes, where did they come into contact 
with these animals?
39. a. Do you keep pets or farm animals?
 b. If so, which ones?
40. Do you ride or take care of horses?
41. Do you visit farms or petting zoos?
abroad
42. a. Have you been abroad the previous year?
 b.  If so, please name the countries you trav-
elled to in your last five trips abroad within 
a maximum timespan of two years. And 
whether or not you visited a hospital then.
 c.  If you visit a hospital abroad in the last 
two years, what was the reason? (Visit 
a patient, small surgery, outpatient clinic 
visit, admitted to hospital as patient, for 
work, other)
 d.  Did you become MRSA positive after your 
visit to an abroad hospital in the last two 
years?
 e.  Did you visit a Dutch hospital after your 
abroad hospital visit?
 f. Have you ever been in an abroad hospital?
43. a.  Did a household or family member become 
MRSA positive after an abroad hospital 
visit? (in the last two years)
 b.  Has a household or family member been 
to a Dutch hospital after visit an abroad 
hospital? (in the last two years)
 c.  Has a household or family member ever 
been to an abroad hospital?
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Combining high resolution typing by cgMLST with 
epidemiological data improves the identification of 











Introduction: The Netherlands has a growing population carrying methicillin resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus of Unknown Origin (MUO, i.e. carriers without know risk factors). 
Earlier findings from a case control study on MUO, drove us to identify links of MUO with 
MRSA of Known Origin (MKO, i.e. carriers with known risk factors).
Methods: We used core genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) combined with 
epidemiological data on a set of 106 ST8 MRSA (54 MUO and 52 MKO) from three 
regions in the Netherlands, to identify the origin of MUO and link them to known clusters 
of MRSA.
Results: We successfully identified the origin of 26% (14/54) of MUO by clustering them 
genetically and epidemiologically to other carriers of MRSA. We were able to identify 
regional Dutch clusters within a group of ST8 MRSA isolates, as well as detect two MRSA 
clusters imported from Taiwan and Aruba. Furthermore, we found that MUO isolates that 
were cultured in two different medical microbiological laboratories within the Rotterdam 
region belonged to the same genetic cluster. 
Discussion: Through the combined effort of cgMLST and epidemiological data, we identi-
fied the origin of 26% (14/54) of MUO by successfully linking MUO to other known carriers 
of MRSA. The sources for two MUO clusters were MUO carriers which had their MRSA 
from abroad and who had not visited foreign health care centers. At least at regional level, 
cgMLST should be combined with epidemiological data to identify the sources of MRSA 
of previously unknown origin.
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iNtrODUctiON
Traditionally, The Netherlands has low MRSA prevalence rates (0.11% 2007). However, 
a growing population of MRSA carriers are being detected without known risk factors as 
defined by our national MRSA guideline.1 These known risk factors are used to screen at 
hospital admission for MRSA carriage and carriers without defined risk factors are mostly 
detected accidentally, for example from clinical cultures, i.e. from samples not taken with 
the purpose to screen for MRSA. 2 
The Dutch Health Inspectorate has urged all hospitals to submit MRSA isolates and sup-
porting epidemiological data to National Institute for Health and the Environment (RIVM) 
as part of the Dutch national MRSA database. 3 As a result, a large collection of MRSA 
isolates and accompanying epidemiological data is available. The number of MRSA car-
riers without risk factors, defined as MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO), increased in 2016 
to 38% (810/2,121) of total reported MRSA isolates 4 from 31% (1000/3,247) in 2011 
and 27% (786/2,969) in 2009.1, 5 This is a significant increase of the proportion of MUO. 
(p<0.01 for 2009-2011, 2011-2016 and 2009-2016)
The last few years, highly discriminatory techniques such as whole-genome sequenc-
ing (WGS) have become popular to use in explaining and managing outbreaks. 6-9 Epide-
miological studies using WGS focused on special communities like hospitals 9-12, or other 
relatively small communities such as long term care facilities13, or households.14 However, 
such techniques can also be used on a national level to explore transmission routes, in 
health care centres and in the community, and to explore new reservoirs or risk groups. 
The use of WGS techniques will increase our ability to infer if MRSA isolates are truly 
MUO or that they can be genotypically linked to MRSA isolates of known origin (MKO) 
and/or regional MRSA clusters. 
To identify the origin of MRSA in MUO, we previously performed a case control study to 
detect new epidemiological risk factors present in these MUO and successfully correlated 
MUO with newly identified risk factors.15 Compared to controls, 10% of MUO carriers 
correlated with having been a contact of a MRSA carrier in the past. (aOR 4.3)15 At the 
time of contact and first screening, these MRSA carriers were not detected as MRSA 
positive. When MRSA was detected at a later stage, usually in a clinical sample, there 
was no recognition of a known epidemiological link and therefore such MRSA carriers 
were labelled as MUO. 
This previous finding drove us to identify links of MUO with MKO. As sequence type 
8 (ST8) was the most prevalent sequence type among MUO and MKO1 in Dutch MRSA 
isolates, we explored whether ST8 MUO isolates could be linked to well-defined ST8 
MKO isolates and clusters through the use of core-genome multi locus sequence typing 
(cgMLST).
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We hypothesized that we could link MUO to other MKO- MRSA isolates and define new 
clusters based on genetic and epidemiological data, and thereby identify new plausible 
reservoirs or sources of MRSA. 
MethODs
General definitions
MUO are defined as persons in whom MRSA was detected, but at time of detection with-
out known risk factors as described in the Dutch MRSA guideline by the Dutch Working 
group of Infection Prevention (WIP).2 MKO are defined as persons in whom MRSA was 
detected and who had known risk factors according to the same Dutch MRSA guideline.1
Spa-type association to ST8 was determined by use of the spa-typing website (http://
www.spaserver.ridom.de) that is developed by Ridom GmbH and curated by SeqNet.org 
(http://www.SeqNet.org/). 
Epidemiological information was defined as any data which could identify a transmis-
sion between MRSA carriers, i.e. data related to described risk factors in the Dutch MRSA 
guideline, any data obtained from the national case control questionnaire15, such as jobs, 
abroad visits, etc., and any additional data collected by infection control practitioners on 
transmission routes, such as shared family members, stays on wards, etc.
Definitions for inclusion
Isolates were collected from two groups. Group 1 was defined as all MRSA isolates from 
MRSA carriers who had participated in a former large national case control study between 
2011 and 201315, and whose spa-types were associated with ST8. We had already col-
lected extensive epidemiological background information on these MRSA carriers15, and 
ST8 is the most common ST among MUO (14% of MUO in the Netherlands).1 Of the 232 
MUO cases in the national case control study, 30 were ST8 isolates. These were from one 
of three regions based on proximity to our hospital: the Rotterdam region (25 km radius), 
the larger Randstad city region (60 km radius), and the eastern region of The Netherlands 
(150 km east of Rotterdam). 
Group 2 was defined as all MRSA isolates from the Erasmus Medical Centre Rotterdam 
from 2008 until 2013 with spa-types associated with ST8 (MUO or MKO)(Flowchart 1), 
and whose epidemiology was known in detail to our local infection prevention unit. Group 
2 isolates were from three subgroups: hospital outbreak clusters, household clusters and 
non-clustered isolates. (Table 1). 
All included isolates 43% (28/64) were Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) positive and 
had been stored at -80°C prior to the study. 
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Non-clustered isolates were isolates that could not be linked to any clusters by spa-
typing and epidemiology, and which could be either MUO or MKO depending on the 
presence of any known risk factors at the time of detection.
Definitions for outcome
MRSA clusters were defined as two or more MRSA isolates clustered together based 
on core genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) if the difference in core genome 
genes between the two isolates was less than 10 genes. Epidemiological data of the new 
clusters were rechecked after cgMLST analyses to explain new links between MUO and 
MKO.
DNa isolation
MRSA strains were grown overnight at 37°C on Tryptic soya agar (TSA) and chromosomal 
DNA was isolated using a QIAamp DNA mini kit (Qiagen, Hilden, Germany) according to 
the protocol recommended by the manufacturer. 
Whole genome sequencing
Isolates were transported under constant -20°C conditions from The Netherlands to 
Scotland, where the isolates were whole-genome sequenced at Edinburgh Genomics 
(University of Edinburgh, Scotland). DNA samples were quality assessed on arrival and 
then prepared for independent barcoded genomic DNA sequencing libraries. Library 
preparation took place with Nextera XT (Illumina, San Diego, USA). The libraries were 
pooled into two independent libraries of 96 samples each and sequenced for 100 base 
paired end in a HiSeq 2500 (Illuimina, San Diego, USA) with at least 25 times coverage.








Group 1 National isolates Rotterdam region 10 2 12
 Randstad region 8 2 10
 Eastern region 7 1 8
 total 30
Group 2 Non-clustered isolates Hospital isolates 14 13 27
 Clustered isolates Household isolates 5 16 21
 Hospital isolates 10 18 28
 total 49
MUO: MRSA of unknown origin, MRSA without known risk factors; MKO: MRSA of known origin, MRSA 
with known risk factors. ST: Sequence Type; typed by multi-locus sequence typing (MLST).
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Multi-locus sequence typing
With the sequence data, Multi-Locus Sequence Typing (MLST) was performed using 
SeqSphere software version 3.5.0 (Ridom GmbH, Münster, Germany) for confirmation 
that the selected MRSA isolates were indeed ST8. Isolates not ST8 were excluded from 
further analysis.
core genome multi-locus sequence typing
With the sequence data, core genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) was per-
formed using an available cgMLST scheme in the SeqSphere software version 3.5.0 
(Ridom GmbH, Münster, Germany). The results were imported in BioNumerics version 
7.6.2 to be able to perform further comparative analysis (Applied Math, Sint-Martens-
Latem, Belgium). 
resUlts
isolate selection and characteristics
Thirty-one presumed ST8 isolates were included from our national case control database. 
One was excluded after MLST confirmation check as it was not a ST8. The remaining 
thirty ST8 isolates formed group 1. (Table 1). Of these, 83% (25/30) were defined at time 
of detection as MUO, the rest as MKO. 
For group 2, 84 isolates presumed to be ST8 based on spa-typing, were selected from 
our hospital out of 191 isolates (43.9% 84/191). After MLST, eight isolates were excluded 
and 76 ST8 isolates remained. Twenty-eight isolates were from hospital clusters, 21 from 
household clusters and 27 were non-clustered isolates (Flowchart 1, Table 1). Of these, 
38% (29/76) were MUO, the others were MKO. (Table 1)
cgMlst clustering (group 1 and 2)
Core genome MLST of all 106 isolates from group 1 and group 2 revealed the presence 
of 16 genetic clusters when using a similarity cut-off of ten genes (Figure 1) . The number 
of isolates per cluster ranged from two to 12 isolates with a genetic variance from one to 
15 genes (median 3 genes; average 4.4 genes). In three clusters (B, P and N), we found 
that the maximum genetic distance in the cluster was larger than the set cut-off (10 genes) 
between two isolates.
On average, isolates detected over a two year period formed clusters, and in one case 
(B) this was a period of three years. 
One cluster (L) was formed by merging two previous clusters and one large outbreak 
cluster was split in half to form two new ones (cluster M and N). (Table 2) One cluster from 
group 2 was de-clustered (n=2; Figure 1) after cgMLST. 
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A third (C, D, F, G and J) of the cgMLST clusters were group 1 clusters. These were all 
intraregional clusters from either the Eastern or Randstad region. (Table 2) Of the isolates 
in group one, 43% (13/30) was clustered.
combining epidemiology and cgMlst
Fifty-four MUO isolates were subjected to cgMLST. Of these MUO isolates, 25 clustered 
with other isolates in the minimum spanning tree. The other 29 (53%; 29/54) remained 
non-clustered. Fourteen of the 25 clustered MUO isolates (56% 14/25) could be epide-
miologically explained with the epidemiological data at hand. (Table 2)
Three clusters (D, G and J) from group 1 were found to be household clusters. For 
one cluster (D) no source or possible transmission event could be uncovered. Cluster G 
MUO were found to be MRSA positive in the past and underwent eradication treatment 
repeatedly. We speculate that either the eradication failed or the follow-up was too short. 
In cluster J, a hospital stay abroad of more than two months ago possibly resulted in 
introduction of MRSA into the household. 



































* Excluded due to not having sequence type 8, checked with cgMLST; †Well-defined MRSA isolates from 
the case control study; ‡MRSA isolates from the Erasmus Medical Centre Rotterdam.
ST: Sequence Type; cgMLST: core-genome multi locus sequence typing; spa-typing: staphylococcal 
protein A typing; Rotterdam region: the Rotterdam region (25 km radius); Randstad region: the larger 
Randstad city region (60 km radius); Eastern region: the eastern region of The Netherlands (150 km 
east of Rotterdam).
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The MUO in cluster K was resolved: it was the result of close contact between two 
children (age of 10) from separate families. Cluster L was formed out of two, initially 
considered separate, MUO outbreak clusters becoming one. Thereby identifying many 
MUO as part of one outbreak, except for the initial index carrier who remained an MUO. 
In cluster M, one MUO was solved: a carrier detected half a year post-outbreak, was 
clustered into outbreak cluster M.
For two clusters (B and I) epidemiology could provide a plausible explanation that had 
been previously missed: the first was a cluster of import-MRSA isolates from Taiwan (cluster 
B). The MRSA isolates were from persons who in retrospect had been admitted to the same 
Taiwanese hospital. The isolates in cluster I (2 genes differences within the cluster) were 
two single introductions of Aruban MRSA in the Rotterdam region. Although there were no 
obvious links between these two persons involved, they both originated from the island of 
Aruba. (Table 2) and were detected by two different laboratories in the Rotterdam region. 
For 11 MUO isolates (44%; 11/25) no conclusion could be drawn as to the initial source 




figure 1 – New clusters in the core-genome multi-locus sequence typing tree
Core-genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) of 106 isolates based on 1641 of 1861 common 
genes. Circles are coloured if the isolate was part of one of the 16 new clusters (A to P; see also table 
2) based on cgMLST and epidemiology. White circles are not part of any cluster. Lines between circles 
are the distance in genes.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We clustered 46% (25/54) MUO genetically and successfully linked 56% (14/25) of these 
MUO epidemiologically to other known carriers of MRSA within three Dutch regions. 
Importantly, ST8 isolates in the Netherlands were found to represent multiple, distinct 
clusters. We were able to distinguish regional Dutch ST8 clusters from each other, as well 
as detect import-MRSA clusters from Taiwan and Aruba. In large case-control studies, 
visits abroad have not shown to be an independent risk factor for MUO acquisition 15, 16. 
However, in our case control study, having one or two foreign parents turned out to be 
a risk factor. 15 Together with the detected import-MRSA clusters, our data suggests that 
import of MRSA from higher MRSA prevalence countries may have played a role (Table 
2). Most importantly, we found that some MUO isolates that clustered together within the 
Rotterdam region were cultured in different medical microbiological laboratories (MML) 
and the cluster remained undetected as the findings were not shared between laborato-
ries since there was no necessity for it, such as during outbreaks. Yet, such intraregional 
cgMLST clusters confirm that MRSA control should be a regional effort and that cgMLST 
typing results should always be reported and shared regional. 
Furthermore, Cluster B showed that isolates sampled three years apart from each 
other still clustered. It is therefore likely that by performing cgMLST on a large number 
of isolates obtained over a large time period increases the chance to cluster and identify 
the source of MUO and non-clustered isolates in general. This study focused only on the 
most common sequence type ST8. Despite this, we found previous unknown links, new 
clusters and identified sources for MUO in all three regions examined. It is likely that in 
case of rarer sequence types, common epidemiological links are easier to find, making 
the identification of MUO easier.
Retrospective epidemiological data was used for this study. We had to rely on extensive 
epidemiological information from our earlier case control study that included many detailed 
epidemiological data compared to the standard epidemiological information collected by 
infection control practitioners. An increase in the number of identified MUO is expected if 
we had been able to actively (re)quest the MRSA carriers whose isolates clustered after 
applying cgMLST. 
To identify sources for MUO in the future, epidemiological data are essential, as it the 
typing efficacy. It is therefore of utmost importance that these data are shared regionally 
between MML. We found that we were able to differentiate well between regional clusters 
for ST8 isolates. Which was previously impossible with spa-typing. 
Despite our retrospective approach, we were able to explain 56% of the clustered MUO 
in this study. Ideally, if isolates are clustered over a larger period of time, are shared 
between MML intraregional, and if infection control practitioners can return to MRSA car-
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riers to (re)question them directly after cgMLST clustering; then we have a greater chance 
of further identifying the origins and transmission routes of MUO. 
In conclusion, by combining results of cgMLST and epidemiological data, we were able 
to identify the origin of MUO clustering together with other MRSA isolates in one of three 
Dutch regions and successfully linked 26% of MUO genetically and epidemiologically to 
other carriers of MRSA. Import-MRSA played an important role in most of the identified 
MUO, as well as close contact between primary school children from different families, 
possible roles for failed eradication treatment and a need to share cgMLST and epidemi-
ology across MML to cluster MRSA. 
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sUMMary Of MaiN fiNDiNgs
In this thesis we studied MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO). MUO are MRSA without known 
risk factors as defined in the risk categories of the Dutch Workinggroup for Infection Pre-
vention (WIP) guideline for MRSA.1 As a consequence, MUO carriers are not recognized 
by the so called triage taken at hospital admission. MUO carriers remain undetected and 
thus, during admission, they can spread MRSA in the hospital. We studied MUO strains 
and carriers to find new risk factors and transmission routes, so the MRSA guideline 
can be updated and future MRSA transmission reduced. Below a summary of the main 
findings is given, followed by its conclusions and the recommendations to reduce the 
number of MUO.
In chapter 1 we assessed the magnitude of the MUO problem and determined the dif-
ferences between MUO and MRSA of known origin (MKO). We found that a quarter (24%) 
of 5545 registered MRSA isolates (2009-2010) known at the national reference laboratory 
(RIVM) were MUO. Based on typing, MUO isolates could be divided in two main groups: 
CC398 MUO (26%; 352/1350) and non-CC398 MUO (74%; 998/1350). 
We hypothesised that MUO could have been acquired in the community setting. 
Therefore, we checked all MUO isolates for the presence of Panton-Valentine Leukocidin 
(PVL), as the presence of this virulence factor promotes the spread of MRSA in a com-
munity setting.2 Of all MRSA isolates, 12% (684/5554) were PVL positive. Of all MUO 
isolates 46% (461/998) were PVL positive. Within the group of non-CC398 types, PVL 
positivity was more frequently encountered in MUO compared to MKO (relative risk 1.19; 
95% CI 1.11–1.29). Moreover, community associated spa-types such as spa-types t008 
(ST8), t019 (ST30) and t044 (ST80) were significantly (p<0.01) more present among 
MUO compared to MKO. PVL-positive spa-type t008 was found significantly more often 
among MUO than MKO (10.6% vs. 1.7%, p<0.01). We hypothesised that the presence 
of PVL in these spa-types gave an evolutionary advantage in the community but the 
found difference could also be explained by overrepresentation: MUO are often clinical 
isolates detected by sampling clinical sites although exact figures on this are not known, 
as medical microbiological laboratories (MML) send the MRSA as soon as the MRSA 
carrier is detected. If a MRSA infection occurs later, than this is not known at the RIVM. 
(chapter 1). 
CC398 MRSA positive individuals are known to acquire their CC398 MRSA due to 
exposure to livestock (pigs, veal calves, broilers). However, we identified persons with 
CC398 MUO, who lacked direct contact with livestock. Based on literature, it is assumed 
that human-to-human transmission of CC398 MRSA is less likely, because CC398 MRSA 
is 72% less likely and 6 times less transmittable than non-CC398 MRSA 3, 4, although 
sporadic nosocomial transmission events and outbreaks were described.5, 6 In regards to 
the origin (animal or human) and transmission routes (direct or indirect) of MUO CC398, 
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all options are open. Therefore, CC398 MUO was further explored in chapter 2 to study 
whether the CC398 MUO strains were different from the CC398 MKO strains, and as 
such could more easily transmit from human-to-human than CC398 MKO strains, directly 
transmitted from livestock to humans. For now, there are two CC398 variants: one of 
animal and one of human origin. Besides their differences in transmission, they also differ 
in presence or absence of certain mobile genetic elements (MGEs). 7
By polymerase chain reaction (PCR) we determined whether MGEs - scn, chp, φ3 int, 
φ6 int, φ7 int, rep7, rep27, and cadDX - were present in MUO isolates and by compar-
ing them with a set of CC398 isolates of various known origin (humans, pigs, horses, 
chickens, and veal calves), we studied the origin of CC398 MUO. We found that the 
distinct human CC398 MSSA spa-type, t571, was not present among the Dutch CC398 
MRSA strains from humans and pigs that we studied. Furthermore, the CC398 MUO were 
tetracycline resistant and carried no φ3 bacteriophage with scn and chp. 
In short, the CC398 MRSA in this study, MUO or MKO, were found to resemble CC398 
MRSA as found in pigs and not CC398 MSSA as described as human pathogens. We 
concluded that human CC398 MUO carriers carried MRSA of livestock origin, despite 
MUO carriers not having an epidemiological link with pigs and pig farming. This finding 
is worrisome, as it suggests other transmission routes than direct exposition to livestock. 
in chapter 3 we studied the necessary number of follow-up culture-sets in a retrospec-
tive MRSA carrier cohort (2005-2010) to declare a successful MRSA eradication therapy 
and a non-carriage status. We compared the then standard procedure of three MRSA 
follow-up culture-sets to six culture-sets, to determine when to be cultured and how many 
culture-sets are necessary during a time-period of one year. We found that between the 
third and sixth follow-up culture-set 54% (35/65) of total recurrences occurred. Over 88% 
of all recurrences were detected within two months. Combined nose and throat carriage 
OR 25.5 (1.6-419.1)) and intravascular lines (OR 13.6 (1.2-156.2)) were found to be risk 
factors for early recurrence. An early recurrence is defined as a recurrence during the first 
three follow-up culture-sets as opposed to the last three culture-sets. 
Many seafarers visit the port city of Rotterdam. They are a difficult to contact group due 
to language and cultural barriers and their short stay before shipping off again. Because 
of above reasons, we could not include them in our MUO case control study. Therefore, 
we studied the seafarers separately from the MUO case control study (as described in 
chapter 5) and determined the MRSA prevalence of seafarers in the Netherlands upon 
hospital admission in (chapter 4). We detected a 5.8% (7/124) MRSA prevalence. This 
was a MRSA prevalence 52-times higher than the normal prevalence in the Netherlands 
(0.11% at hospital admission).8 Furthermore, we found that the presence of wounds or 
abscesses gave seafarers a 40-times higher risk of being MRSA positive. This finding 
resulted in addition of seafarers as new risk group for MRSA in the Harbour hospital and 
the Erasmus University Medical Center in Rotterdam. 
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In chapter 5 we described a prospective case control study to determine risk factors 
for MUO acquisition/carriage with the aim to find new risk factors for MRSA, and add 
these to the risk categories of the Dutch MRSA guideline by the (successor of) the Dutch 
Workinggroup for Infectionprevention. 
Between September 1st of 2011 and September 1st of 2013, MUO cases were included 
in a case control study. Cases were all MUO carriers reported to the RIVM in this period, 
with randomly selected controls from the community during the same period. Cases and 
controls were approached by mail and were asked to fill in a questionnaire which included 
the known risk factors as described in the WIP guideline, to be able to filter the MKO 
misclassified as MUO. The questionnaire also contained questions on health, behaviour, 
profession and (sport) activities that could be possible MUO risk factors. These questions 
were chosen based on a literature study and an earlier pilot study (trawing study).
One of the case control study outcomes was that 38% (144/376) of MUO carriers were 
misclassified and actually MKO. These misclassified carriers were excluded from further 
analyses. We found the following significant risk factors for MUO in logistic multivariate 
analysis: antibiotic use in the last twelve months, aOR 8.1 (5.6-11.7), screened as contact 
in a contact tracing but not detected as a MRSA carrier at the time, aOR 4.3 (2.1-8.8), 
having at least one foreign parent, aOR 2.4 (1.4-3.9) and receiving ambulatory care, aOR 
2.3 (1.4-3.7). These risk factors explained 83% of the MUO cases. 
We hypothesised that part of the MUO carriers were initially missed as MRSA carrier, 
only to be later detected and subsequently categorized as MUO. This meant that some 
MUO carriers had unidentified links to other MRSA carriers. Therefore, in chapter 6, 
we studied genetic links between MUO strains and other MRSA (MUO or MKO) strains, 
together with some crude epidemiology data of the carriers. 
Therefore, we included MUO carriers from the case control. We then selected well-
defined hospital and household clusters, and compared them with randomly selected, 
well-defined regional and national isolates. All isolates had the same genetic background 
(ST8) and were clustered with core genome multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST). Our 
goal was to discern or link MUO isolates to known MRSA clusters (MKO) or single MRSA 
isolates (MUO or MKO). In this study, we elucidated 28% (15/54) of MUO by linking them 
to known MRSA clusters or isolates through cgMLST and epidemiology. Moreover, we 
were able to link isolates from the same region but different MML to each other. This re-
sulted in the formation of new regional clusters that previously had gone unnoticed. These 
isolates were considered MUO and not part of a cluster. Also, the use of cgMLST resulted 
in reclassification of old clusters previously based on epidemiology and spa-typing. 
Different typing methods, such as cgMLST, will generate different outcomes and thus 
change the presence and/or the extent of outbreaks and therefore how many people need 
to be screened. Those not screened at the time of the outbreak, and detected later in time, 
will be defined as MUO. CgMLST has a higher discriminatory power, so we were able to 
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discern within and between t008 MRSA clusters as based on spa-typing. Furthermore, 
we successfully discerned between Dutch MRSA t008 clusters and import-MRSA t008 
clusters from Aruba and Taiwan, which was previously not possible with spa-typing. 
cONclUsiONs, recOMMeNDatiONs aND fUtUre PersPectives
In Nethmap 2018, the RIVM reported that 38% (1,066/2,792) of the reported MRSA iso-
lates to the MRSA surveillance in 2017 were MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO).9 Based on 
our findings in the case control study, 38% (144/376 returned questionnaires) of the MUO 
cases in the MRSA surveillance were actually misclassified MKO. Assuming a stable 
amount of misclassification every year this would mean that, in 2017, 23% (661/2792) 
of the reported MRSA to the surveillance were MUO. (In absolute numbers, this is 405 
“MUO” less than originally reported) If we calculate the same for 2009, we had 786 MUO 
from 2874 reported MRSA originally, which becomes 17% (487/2874) after correction 
for misclassification. Which is an estimated increase of 35.7% of MUO over a period of 
8 years (2009-2017). Despite misclassification we are still confronted with a large group 
of MUO. It remains important to understand MUO’s origin. In this thesis we studied MUO 
and learned that they are diverse and fall apart in several subgroups, both genetically as 
epidemiologically. 
MUO cc398
An important subgroup are the MUO CC398 isolates (352/2312 MRSA CC398; 15% as 
described in chapter 1). These are MUO isolates from the livestock associated cluster 
3398, whose carriers had no direct occupational contact to livestock. (As discussed in 
chapter 2.) It is important because The Netherlands, like Denmark, is a low MRSA preva-
lence country with a relative large livestock-associated MRSA reservoir. Also, it is currently 
assumed that the tetracyclin-resistant livestock-associated MRSA (LA-MRSA) does not 
significantly transmit from human to human and acquisition is based on exposure through 
(occupational) contact.3 The limited human-to-human transmission fortunately limits the 
impact of these LA-MRSA strains. The existence of MUO CC398 however implies acqui-
sition despite no direct contact. Thus we hypothesised if MUO CC398 isolates belong to a 
subgroup of this cluster that is solely isolated from humans. McCarthy et al. showed that 
CC398 strains from humans in contact with animals differed from strains isolated from 
humans without contact with animals in mobile genetic element (MGE) content.7 How-
ever, we found MUO CC398 to be similar to MKO CC398 and not part of the subgroup 
of the CC398 solely isolated from humans. (chapter 2) This means that the human host 
adapted MRSA CC398 is less likely the source of MUO CC398. A more likely hypothesis 
for MUO CC398 existence could be indirect transmission, for example by air, rodents, or 
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indirect by exposure of persons in the community to livestock exposed CC398. 10-14 Fur-
ther studies on MUO CC398 are necessary to determine if indirect exposure indeed plays 
an important role in the transmission of MUO CC398 . We also recommend to analyse 
the reported number of MUO CC398, and report the aggregated data nationally and to 
the MML. Presence of MGEs like Φ3 (ΦSa3) in MUO CC398 can be easily monitored, as 
was shown by a study by van Rijen et al. who screened for MUO CC398 with Φ3 and tetM 
allowing the quick distinction between CC398 of animal-, and human origin.15
import-Mrsa and seafarers
A proportion of MUO is directly related to (an exposure to) higher MRSA prevalence 
abroad: so called import-MRSA. For example, seafarers (chapter 4), having a foreign 
parent (chapter 5) or import-MRSA clusters through travellers visiting friends and rela-
tives or through immigration (Aruba, Taiwan) (chapter 6) are all factors explaining part 
of MUO carriers. Interestingly, abroad visits, travelling abroad, and abroad hospital or 
healthcare visits longer than two months ago were not significant risk factors in the case 
control (chapter 5). The question remains whether the arbitrary cut-off of two months 
for hospital visit abroad is not too strict and not too general, as the arbitrary cut-off could 
potentially label some MRSA as MUO who would otherwise be classified and treated as 
MKO. (chapter 5)
Furthermore, we recommend to add seafarers as risk factor for MRSA carriage. Given 
the high prevalence rate of carriage among seafarers, we recommend that all seafarers 
should be classified as WIP category 2, and thus screened for MRSA when they are 
present in the Netherlands, regardless of wounds or underlying disease; and to apply pre-
emptive isolation while awaiting test results. Since 2010, seafarers have been included 
as such in the triage for admission to the Erasmus MC (and the former Harbour hospital). 
The global impact on transmission of MRSA by seafarers is currently unknown. (chapter 
4)
case control risk factors: intersection between healthcare and 
community
The results of the MUO case control suggest that a large portion of MUO cases are 
still healthcare or disease related as we found risk factors such as antibiotic use and 
ambulatory care. We also found that MUO carriers had been screened before in contact 
tracing but had not been detected as MRSA carrier at that time. It seems MUO carriers 
have regular contact with healthcare, but not necessarily the hospital. Most likely they 
acquired their MRSA somewhere in the “fringes of healthcare”, outside the hospital where 
the community and healthcare world overlap. Examples can be ambulatory care or the 
use of antibiotics in nursing homes or at general practitioners. (chapter 5) Adding these 
more general risk factors to the risk categories of the Dutch MRSA guideline of the WIP 
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will possibly decrease the number of MUO, but will also generate high costs of screen-
ing and also a higher burden if we also choose to pre-emptive isolate the additionally 
screened patients as well, because of the larger number of people who qualify for having 
one of these risk factors. The total number of people needed to be screened to find one 
MUO with new, general risk factors such as ambulatory care use or use of antibiotics, 
could become quite high and therefore be too expensive and too labour intensive. Still, 
our general risk factors explained 83% of the MUO cases in the case control. A different 
approach using a risk algorithm is therefore desirable, (vide infra). For the remaining 17% 
of MUO cases no explanation was found. 
For case control studies, the choice for the controls is difficult but important. As stated 
above, we found general risk factors that explained 83% of MUO. However, the outcome 
of a case control study depends highly on the choice of the control; matched or not. Our 
study of MUO’s characteristics (chapter 1) and the initial trawling questionnaire (chapter 
5) revealed a very diverse group of carriers, a diversity better paralleled by choosing a 
community control group. Cases, i.e. MUO carriers were not just MRSA carriers reported 
by hospitals, but also those reported by general practitioners (GP) or long-term care 
facilities (LTCF). If we would select controls only from patients admitted or treated at the 
hospital or also from the GP or LTCF, then each option would result in a different control 
population. We also considered matching on having an (suspected) infection, as MUO 
are often discovered by accident – for example from clinical isolates. However, this was 
not possible as it was not certain whether reported cases had an infection or not. The 
registration of the presence of infection was not reliable. If the submitted case isolate was 
not an isolate of an infectious site, then infection elsewhere or later could not be ruled 
out. Furthermore, our case control was set up to find unknown risk factors without a-prior 
bias. Matching would introduce bias and decrease the change on finding risk factors. 
Therefore, we chose unmatched controls selected from the community, reducing bias 
as much as possible while maximizing the chance to find new risk factors within the 
MUO population. Given the known prevalence of MRSA in the community (between 0 
and 0.11%8) we assumed the chance of including a MRSA carrier as a control too low to 
screen for.
To identify patients at risk for MRSA carriage, an algorithm is necessary that computes 
the a-prior risk for MRSA carriage using the current WIP risk factors and our newly defined 
case control risk factors. Unfortunately, some of the new risk factors are too general 
and/or too frequent, to use them as a yes/no answer in normal triage for admission. In 
future, an algorithm should be developed in which factors are weighted in a specified 
population, so a weighted risk can be calculated from more than one factor. The outcome 
of this algorithm should then lead to measures to prevent transmission of MRSA. Ideally, 
a national uniformity in this algorithm and performance should be aimed for.
Summary, conclusions, recommendations and future perspectives 109
Finally, to enhance feasibility and completeness, an interactive chatbot could be pro-
grammed with the questions to be used by patients to be admitted or treated. The inputted 
answers can be loaded into an algorithm to calculate the a-prior risk of MRSA carriage. 
Chatbot technology is already in use today and used by companies with many clients, 
such as KLM.16 
Mrsa recurrence after Mrsa eradication therapy
MRSA recurrence is missed when using only three follow-up culture-sets after MRSA 
eradication therapy. These MRSA recurrences can later be detected as MUO. We showed 
that MRSA recurrences are missed in 54% (35/65 recurrences) when using three follow-
up culture-sets in comparison to six follow-up culture-sets. Using our results, the then 
WIP guideline was changed on the timing of culture-sets after MRSA eradication therapy 
(chapter 3). We recommend five culture-sets within a period of one year after eradication 
therapy. In the 6 months after eradication therapy, we recommend to frequently culture 
carriers whose MRSA was eradicated and who are at risk for early recurrence. Persons 
at risk for early recurrence are those with combined nose and throat carriage (OR 25.5 
(1.6–419.1)) or those who have intravascular lines (OR 13.6 (1.2–156.2)). Persons with 
late recurrence, could have their follow-up culture-sets with more time in between each 
set, with a final culture-set one year after their eradication therapy. Persons at risk for 
early recurrence are detected sooner, and their recurrence happens within six months. 
These persons would then not have to wait a year for their final follow-up culture-set. This 
recommendation is a balance between the need for swift detection of MRSA recurrence, 
the patients’ burden, and lowering the number of missed MRSA recurrences after suc-
cessful MRSA eradication therapy. 
Misclassification of MKO as MUO
We encountered a high number of misclassified MKO isolates that were listed in the 
national MRSA database as MUO. Analysis of the case control study showed 38% of all 
MUO isolates in the MRSA surveillance database were actually MKO. Misclassification 
can be attributed to early uploading accompanying epidemiological data to the RIVM 
together with sending the MRSA strain by medical microbiological laboratories (MML) to 
the RIVM. This early uploaded data, especially before the typing results are known, will 
lead to less details on possible MRSA risk factors (chapter 5). It is not always possible 
to ascertain the source of acquisition before the typing result is available. Typing results 
should be used to elucidate sources and transmission routes. When sources happen to 
be the healthcare centre, then the MRSA carrier can be defined as a MKO. The solution 
to this problem is a two-step procedure: first, the strain is sent and then, after getting 
back and analysing the typing results, the MML is asked for the final epidemiological 
decision whether we are dealing with a MKO or a MUO. This decision will depend on the 
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(assumed) sources and risk factors of the carrier. Ideally the typing results are returned 
to the medical professionals in the shortest turn-around-time to support contact tracing 
efforts and help them define MRSA sources. The latter should then be reported back to 
the MRSA surveillance, further improving the reliability of the epidemiological data.
Misclassification is due to the quality of the epidemiological data. This quality is based 
on the time, effort and possibility to acquire the data. Currently, there is no standard 
procedure when contacting and questioning MRSA carriers or contact tracing and who 
should do that. So the inputted effort will vary per person as will the quality. A procedure for 
questioning and contacting MRSA carriers is therefore recommended. Misclassification 
can also happen through limited contact tracing in MRSA outbreaks (chapter 5 and 6). 
Too limited contact tracing will miss MRSA carriers (and thus MKO) who can be detected 
later or elsewhere as MUO. This could explain the found risk factor in the case control 
study: having been screened in the past before for MRSA carriage, but found to be MRSA 
negative at that time.
remaining MUO and the necessity to cooperate and type
There is a remaining portion of MUO that cannot be explained. In our case control study, 
this was 17%. Taking the Nethmap 2018 data, this would mean that out of the 661 MUO 
in 2017 (23% of total reported MRSA to the surveillance), 17% (112/661) would remain 
without explanation. That would be 4% (112/2792) of total MRSA reported to the MRSA 
surveillance in 2017. (Figure 1) This remaining group consists of various MUO cases in 
which we could not identify risk factors in our study. A proportion of these MUO may still 
be elucidated if genomic information from MRSA isolates across healthcare institutions or 
within a ZorgRegio or even nationally are combined. We have shown that two MMLs in 
the Rotterdam region each discovered a MUO independent of each other, without know-
ing these two were genetically linked, until they were linked through our cgMLST data 
(chapter 6). We also show in chapter 6 that we can discern between clonal t008 MRSA 
clusters with the higher discriminatory power using cgMLST. Application of cgMLST data 
by MML in contact tracing could prove crucial to elucidate the last remaining 17% of MUO 
cases in The Netherlands.
Preferably these data should also be shared within the regional network of healthcare 
institutions to detect intraregional (outbreak) clusters (such as described in chapter 6). 
The current Antibiotic Resistance Care Network or ZorgRegio ABR could take up this 
task and find a way to share data on MRSA strains, typing results and carriers. Ideally, 
healthcare institutions within the ZorgRegio should be informed on MRSA carriers in the 
region, and they could be asked to make agreements on sharing information and equal-
izing policies, taking into account the privacy laws. Sharing information on MRSA carriers 
and MRSA strains between institutes, especially if the patient is not directly transferred, is 
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figure 1 – Dutch Mrsa and MUO, relative contributions 
Data for MUO were generated by using results of the MUO case control study applied to the Nethmap 
2018 MRSA data (n=2792). Data for MKO were generated by using MRSA surveillance data of 2008-
2011 and extrapolating the average percentage to the given numbers in the Nethmap 2018 data. Defini-
tion of misclassified: MRSA isolates indicated as MUO by the MMLs in the questionnaire sent to RIVM 
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figure 2 – MUO compared to MkO in absolute numbers
Data for MUO were generated by using results of the MUO case control study applied to the Nethmap 
2018 MRSA data (n=2792). Data for MKO were generated by using MRSA surveillance data of 2008-
2011 and extrapolating the average percentage to the given numbers in the Nethmap 2018 data. Defini-
tion of misclassified: MRSA isolates indicated as MUO by the MMLs in the questionnaire sent to RIVM 
but defined in our case control study as MKO.
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highly desirable from an infection prevention point of view, but may right now be a bridge 
too far. 
In summary, we make the following recommendations: to conduct further studies on 
MUO CC398, to monitor MUO CC398 in surveillance and feedback to national and MML 
level, to add seafarers as MRSA risk group to the Dutch MRSA guideline, as well as 
classify seafarers as a WIP category 2, to make a risk algorithm, in which a weighted 
a-prior risk is calculated based on multiple risk factors, to culture post-MRSA eradication 
therapy with five follow-up culture-sets, four of which in the first two months (the fourth in 2 
months) after MRSA eradication therapy and the latter after half a year or year depending 
on the presence of risk factors or being a healthcare worker. Other recommendations are 
to reduce misclassification through more intensive collaboration between RIVM which 
provides typing, and the MML that provide the epidemiological data, to share at least 
the typing data within the ZorgRegio and if possible also on a supraregional level so that 
arbitrary boundaries between adherence areas of MML do not limit our ability to discover 
MRSA clusters and to continue to monitor the number of MUO as 17% of Dutch MUO are 
without risk factor or explanation.
Continuous control of MUO is essential to keep MRSA prevalence low in The Nether-
lands! 
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NeDerlaNDse saMeNvattiNg
In dit proefschrift hebben we MRSA van onbekende origine (MRSA of Unknown Origin, 
MUO) bestudeerd. MUO zijn MRSA zonder bekende risicofactoren zoals gedefinieerd in 
de risicocategorieën van de Nederlandse MRSA richtlijn van de werkgroep voor infectie-
preventie (WIP). 1 Als gevolg hiervan worden MUO dragers niet herkend tijdens triage bij 
ziekenhuisopname. De MUO dragers blijven dus onontdekt tijdens opname en kunnen op 
die manier een verspreidingsbron van MRSA in het ziekenhuis worden. Wij hebben MUO 
dragers en hun stammen bestudeerd om nieuwe risicofactoren en transmissieroutes te 
vinden, zodat de MRSA richtlijn kan worden aangescherpt, en zo de kans op MRSA trans-
missie in de toekomst te verlagen. Hieronder volgt een samenvatting van de belangrijkste 
bevindingen van dit proefschrift, gevolgd door de conclusies en aanbevelingen om het 
aantal MUO te verminderen.
In hoofdstuk 1 hebben we de omvang van het MUO probleem en de verschillen tussen 
MUO en MRSA van bekende oorsprong (MRSA of known origin, MKO) onderzocht. In 
een kwart (24%) van de 5545 bij het nationale referentielaboratorium (RIVM) gedurende 
2009 en 2010 geregistreerde MRSA isolaten, bleek het om een MUO te gaan. Op basis 
van genetische typering konden de MUO isolaten onderverdeeld worden in MUO CC398 
(26%; 352/1350) en MUO niet-CC398 (74%; 998/1350). 
We veronderstelden dat MUO verworven zou kunnen zijn in de “community”. Daarom 
hebben we alle MUO isolaten gecontroleerd op de aanwezigheid van Panton-Valentine 
Leukocidin (PVL), omdat de aanwezigheid van deze virulentiefactor de verspreiding van 
MRSA in een “community” bevordert.2 Van alle MRSA isolaten was 12% (684/5554) PVL-
positief. Van alle MUO isolaten was 46% (461/998) PVL-positief. Binnen de groep van 
niet-CC398-typen werd vaker PVL-aangetroffen in MUO stammen (68%; 317/998) dan 
in MKO stammen (10%; 144/1407) (relatief risico 1,19, 95% CI 1,11-1,29). Bovendien 
waren “community”-gerelateerde spa-types zoals t008 (ST8), t019 (ST30) en t044 (ST80) 
significant meer aanwezig (p<0.01) onder MUO isolaten dan onder MKO isolaten. Het 
PVL-positieve spa-type t008 werd significant vaker gevonden onder MUO isolaten dan 
onder MKO isolaten (10,6% versus 1,7%, p <0,01). We veronderstellen dat de aanwezig-
heid van PVL in deze spa-typen een evolutionair voordeel geeft in de “community”, maar 
het gevonden verschil kan ook worden verklaard door oververtegenwoordiging: MUO zijn 
vaak klinische isolaten die worden gedetecteerd door klinische locaties te bemonsteren. 
Exacte getallen hierover ontbreken, aangezien medisch microbiologische laboratoria 
meestal de MRSA stam insturen zodra de MRSA drager is gedetecteerd. Als later dan 
infectie met MRSA ontstaat, dan is dit niet bekend bij het RIVM. (hoofdstuk 1).
MRSA CC398-positieve personen krijgen hun MRSA CC398 als gevolg van bloot-
stelling aan vee (varkens, vleeskalveren, vleeskuikens). Echter, wij hebben personen 
geïdentificeerd met MUO CC398, die geen direct contact hebben gehad met vee. Uit de 
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literatuur blijkt dat transmissie van MRSA CC398 van mens tot mens niet zo waarschijnlijk 
is, omdat MRSA CC398 72% minder waarschijnlijk en 6 keer minder overdraagbaar zijn 
dan MRSA niet-CC398 3, 4, hoewel er wel sporadisch nosocomiale transmissie en uitbra-
ken zijn beschreven.5, 6 In het kader van de origine (dier of mens) en transmissieroutes 
(direct of indirect) van de MUO CC398 zijn dus nog alle opties open. De MUO CC398 
hebben wij daarom verder bestudeerd in hoofdstuk 2 waarbij de vraag was of MUO 
CC398 stammen anders waren dan MKO CC398 stammen en gemakkelijker van mens-
tot-mens overgedragen konden worden dan MKO CC398 stammen, welke voornamelijk 
overgedragen worden van vee op mensen. Vooralsnog blijken er namelijk twee CC398 
varianten te bestaan : één van dierlijk-, en één van menselijk afkomst. Naast de verschil-
len in hun manier van verspreiden zijn er ook verschillen in de aan- en afwezigheid van 
mobiele genetische elementen (MGE’s).7 
We bepaalden met behulp van polymerasekettingreacties (PCR) of de MGE’s: scn, 
chp, φ3 int, φ6 int, φ7 int, rep7, rep27 en cadDX – aanwezig waren in MUO-isolaten en 
door deze te vergelijken met een set CC398-isolaten van verschillende doch bekende 
oorsprong (mensen, varkens, paarden, kippen en vleeskalveren), hebben we de oor-
sprong van MUO CC398 onderzocht. We vonden dat het onderscheidende humane 
MSSA CC398 spa-type t571 niet aanwezig was onder de Nederlandse MRSA CC398 
stammen van mensen en vee. Daarnaast waren de MUO CC398 tetracycline resistent en 
was de φ3 bacteriofaag met scn en chp afwezig.
Samenvattend, de MRSA CC398 in deze studie, MUO of MKO, lijken het meest op 
de MRSA CC398 afkomstig van vee en niet op de CC398 stammen reeds beschreven 
als menselijk pathogeen. We concludeerden dat humane MUO CC398 dragers MRSA 
van dierlijke oorsprong droegen ondanks dat deze MUO dragers geen epidemiologisch 
verband met bijvoorbeeld varkens en varkenshouderij hadden. Deze bevinding is zorg-
wekkend, omdat het andere transmissieroutes suggereert dan directe blootstelling aan 
vee.
In hoofdstuk 3 bestudeerden we in een retrospectief MRSA-dragerscohort (2005-
2010) het benodigde aantal follow-up kweeksets om een  succesvolle MRSA eradicatie 
therapie en subsequent niet-dragerschapstatus vast te stellen. We vergeleken de 
toenmalige standaardprocedure van drie MRSA follow-up kweeksets met zes kweeksets 
om te bepalen wanneer er moet worden gekweekt, en hoeveel kweeksets er nodig zijn 
gedurende een periode van een jaar. We vonden dat tussen de derde en de zesde follow-
up kweekset 54% (35/65) van het totaal aantal recidieven plaats vond. Meer dan 88% van 
alle recidieven werd binnen twee maanden gedetecteerd. Gecombineerde neus- en keel 
dragerschap OR 25,5 (1,6-419,1)) en intravasculaire lijnen (OR 13.6 (1.2-156.2)) bleken 
risicofactoren te zijn voor vroeg recidiveren. Een vroeg recidief wordt gedefinieerd als 
een recidief tijdens de eerste drie follow-up kweeksets in tegenstelling tot de laatste drie 
kweeksets, bij het in totaal doen van zes kweeksets.
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Veel zeevarenden bezoeken de havenstad Rotterdam. Ze zijn een moeilijk te contac-
teren groep vanwege taal- en culturele barrières en hun korte verblijf in Rotterdam. Van-
wege bovenstaande redenen konden de zeevarenden niet opgenomen worden in een 
case control studie (zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 5), maar bepaalden we de MRSA 
prevalentie van zeevarenden in het Havenziekenhuis na ziekenhuisopname (hoofdstuk 
4). We ontdekten een MRSA-prevalentie van 5,8% (7/124) onder zeevarenden. Dit betrof 
een MRSA prevalentie die 52 keer hoger was dan de normale prevalentie in Nederland 
(0,11% bij ziekenhuisopname).8 Bovendien bleken zeevaarders met wonden of abcessen 
40-maal vaker MRSA-positief te zijn dan zeevaarders zonder. Deze bevinding heeft geleid 
tot het opnemen van zeevarenden als een nieuwe risicogroep voor MRSA dragerschap 
voor het Havenziekenhuis en het ErasmusMC in Rotterdam.
In hoofdstuk 5 beschrijven we de prospectieve case control studie waarin risicofactoren 
voor MUO verwerving/dragerschap zijn onderzocht met als doel om nieuwe risicofactoren 
voor MRSA dragerschap te vinden, en deze toe te voegen aan de risicocategorieën van 
de Nederlandse MRSA richtlijn van de (opvolger van de) werkgroep infectiepreventie.
Wij hebben een case control studie uitgevoerd, waarin MUO die gedetecteerd waren 
tussen 1 september 2011 en 1 september 2013, zijn geïncludeerd. Cases waren alle 
MUO dragers gerapporteerd aan het RIVM in deze periode, met als controles willekeurig 
geselecteerde personen uit de samenleving in dezelfde periode. Cases en controles 
werden per post benaderd en werden gevraagd om een  vragenlijst in te vullen met de 
bekende risicofactoren zoals beschreven in de WIP-richtlijn, om zo de eventuele MKO 
eruit te filteren die onterecht als MUO geclassificeerd waren. De vragenlijst bevatte daar-
naast ook vragen over gezondheid, gedrag, beroep en (sport) activiteiten die mogelijk 
risicofactoren zouden kunnen zijn voor het oplopen van een MUO stam. Deze vragen 
waren gekozen op basis van literatuur studie en een eerdere pilot studie (trawling studie).
Een van de uitkomsten van deze case control studie was dat 38% (144/376) van de 
MUO dragers verkeerd waren geclassificeerd en feitelijk MKO waren. Deze fout geclas-
sificeerde dragers werden daarom uitgesloten van verdere analyses. Middels logistische 
multivariaat analyse kwamen de volgende significante risicofactoren voor MUO drager-
schap naar voren: antibioticagebruik in de laatste twaalf maanden, aOR 8.1 (5.6-11.7), 
eerder gescreend als contact in een contactonderzoek maar toen niet gedetecteerd als 
een MRSA-drager, aOR 4.3 (2.1-8.8), het hebben van tenminste één buitenlandse ouder, 
aOR 2.4 (1.4-3.9) en het ontvangen van ambulante zorg, aOR 2.3 (1.4-3.7). Deze risico-
factoren verklaarden 83% (192/232) van de MUO cases.
We veronderstelden dat een deel van de MUO dragers aanvankelijk als MRSA drager 
werd gemist, om later alsnog te worden gedetecteerd en vervolgens te worden gecate-
goriseerd als een MUO. Als dit zo is, dan zou dit betekenen dat sommige MUO dragers 
niet-geïdentificeerde links naar andere MRSA dragers hebben. Daarom is in hoofdstuk 
6 het moleculair-genetische verband bestudeerd tussen MUO stammen en andere MRSA 
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stammen (MUO of MKO), samen met enkele epidemiologische gegevens van de dragers 
wat het mogelijk maakt om MUO dragers te koppelen aan andere MRSA dragers (MUO 
of MKO). 
Hiertoe hebben we MUO dragers uit de case control geïncludeerd. We hebben 
vervolgens goed gedefinieerde ziekenhuis- en huishoudclusters geselecteerd en deze 
vergeleken met willekeurig geselecteerde, goed gedefinieerde regionale en nationale iso-
laten. Alle isolaten hadden dezelfde genetische achtergrond (ST8) en waren geclusterd 
met multi-locus sequentie-typering van het kerngenoom (cgMLST). Ons doel was om 
MUO isolaten te onderscheiden van of te koppelen aan bekende MRSA-clusters (MKO) 
of andere niet-geclusterde MRSA isolaten (MUO of MKO). In deze studie konden we 
28% (15/54)  van de MUO isolaten verklaren door ze te koppelen aan bekende MRSA 
clusters of isolaten via cgMLST en epidemiologie. Bovendien waren we in staat isolaten 
uit dezelfde regio, maar gedetecteerd door verschillende MML, aan elkaar te koppelen. 
Hierdoor werden nieuwe regionale clusters aangetoond die voorheen onopgemerkt 
waren gebleven. Deze isolaten werden eerder als MUO beschouwd en waren voor het 
insturende MML toendertijd geen deel van een cluster. Ook resulteerde het gebruik van 
cgMLST in herindeling van oude clusters, die voorheen waren gebaseerd op epidemio-
logie en spa-typering.
Verschillende typeringsmethoden, zoals cgMLST, zullen verschillende uitkomsten 
genereren en kunnen als zodanig de aanwezigheid en / of de omvang van uitbraken 
veranderen, en daarmee de hoeveelheid mensen die nog gescreend moet worden. 
Degenen die niet zijn gescreend op het moment van de uitbraak en die later alsnog 
worden gedetecteerd, worden gedefinieerd als MUO dragers. CgMLST heeft een hoger 
onderscheidend vermogen dan spa-typering, dus we konden onderscheid maken binnen 
en tussen t008 MRSA clusters (voorheen geclusterd op basis van spa-typering). Verder 
hebben we met succes onderscheid kunnen maken tussen Nederlandse MRSA t008 
clusters en import-MRSA t008 clusters uit Aruba en Taiwan, wat voorheen niet mogelijk 
was met spa-typering.
cONclUsies, aaNbeveliNgeN eN tOekOMstPersPectieveN
In 2018 rapporteerde het RIVM dat 38% (1.066 / 2.792) van de gemelde MRSA isolaten 
aan de MRSA-surveillance in 2017 een MRSA van onbekende origine (MUO) was.9 Onze 
bevindingen van de case control studie, tonen aan dat 38% (144/376 teruggezonden vra-
genlijsten) van de MUO isolaten uit de MRSA surveillance verkeerd geclassificeerde MKO 
waren. Uitgaande van een stabiel aantal misclassificaties per jaar zou dit betekenen dat, 
in 2017, 23% (661/2792) van de gemelde MRSA isolaten aan de surveillance daadwer-
kelijk MUO was. (In absolute aantallen betekent dit 405 “MUO” minder dan oorspronkelijk 
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gerapporteerd.) Als we hetzelfde berekenen voor 2009, hadden we oorspronkelijk 786 
MUO uit 2874 gerapporteerde MRSA, waar na correctie voor misclassificatie nog 17% 
(487/2874) overblijft. Over een periode van 8 jaar (2009-2017) geeft dat een geschatte 
toename van het aantal MUO met 35,7%. Ondanks misclassificatie van MUO, blijft er nog 
steeds een grote groep van MUO over. Het is dus nog steeds belangrijk antwoorden te 
vinden op de vraag waar ze vandaan komen. In dit proefschrift zijn we op zoek gegaan 
naar MUO en we hebben gevonden dat MUO geen homogene groep zijn en uit elkaar 
vallen in verschillende subgroepen, zowel genetisch als epidemiologisch.
MUO cc398
Een belangrijke subgroep van de MUO isolaten zijn de MUO CC398 (352/2312 MRSA 
CC398; 15% zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk 1). Dit zijn MUO isolaten uit het vee-
geassocieerde cluster 398, wiens dragers geen directe beroepscontact met vee hadden. 
(Zoals besproken in hoofdstuk 2.) Dit is een belangrijk gegeven, omdat Nederland een 
land is met een lage MRSA prevalentie, maar met een relatief groot vee-geassocieerd 
MRSA-reservoir, net als in Denemarken. Ook wordt er van uitgegaan dat de tetracycline 
resistente vee-geassocieerde MRSA CC398 (LA-MRSA) niet significant van mens tot 
mens overgaat en dat de transmissie gebaseerd is op blootstelling via (beroeps) contact.4 
De beperkte van-mens-tot-mens transmissie limiteert gelukkig tot op heden de impact 
van LA-MRSA-stammen op de gezondheidszorg. Het bestaan  van MUO CC398 impli-
ceert echter acquisitie, zonder (direct) contact met vee. Daarom was onze vraagstelling 
of MUO CC398 mogelijk tot een subgroep van dit genetische cluster behoren, die allen in 
mensen gevonden wordt. McCarthy et al. toonden aan dat CC398-stammen van mensen 
in contact met dieren verschilden van CC398-stammen geïsoleerd van mensen zonder 
contact met dieren qua gehalte van mobiele genetische elementen (MGE).7 Wij vonden 
echter dat de MUO CC398 stammen vergelijkbaar waren met de MKO CC398 stammen 
en dus niet tot het menselijk cluster behoren (hoofdstuk 2). Dit betekent dat aan de mens 
aangepaste MRSA CC398 waarschijnlijk niet de oorsprong zijn van MUO CC398. Een 
waarschijnlijkere hypothese voor het bestaan  van MUO CC398 zou indirecte overdracht 
kunnen zijn, bijvoorbeeld via de lucht, knaagdieren, of indirect door blootstelling van 
personen in de gemeenschap die op hun beurt wel waren blootgesteld aan LA-MRSA.10-14 
Verder onderzoek is noodzakelijk om vast te stellen of indirecte overdracht inderdaad een 
rol speelt in de verspreiding van MUO CC398. Ook bevelen wij aan om gerapporteerde 
MUO CC398 te analyseren en de geaggregeerde data terug te rapporteren op zowel na-
tionaal niveau als per insturend MML. De aanwezigheid van MGE als Φ3 (ΦSa3) in MUO 
CC398 zou makkelijk gemonitord kunnen worden, zoals eerder is uitgevoerd door van 
Rijen et al., die voor MUO CC398 screenden aan de hand van Φ3 en tetM waardoor een 
snelle rubricering tussen CC398 van dierlijke-, of menselijk oorsprong mogelijk wordt.15
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import-Mrsa en zeevarenden
Een deel van de MUO is direct gerelateerd aan (blootstelling aan) hogere MRSA-
prevalentie in het buitenland: de zogenaamde import-MRSA. Bijvoorbeeld zeevarenden 
(hoofdstuk 4), het hebben van een buitenlandse ouder (hoofdstuk 5) of import-MRSA-
clusters via reizigers die vrienden en familieleden bezoeken of via immigratie (Aruba, 
Taiwan) (hoofdstuk 6). Dit zijn allemaal factoren die een deel van de MUO dragers 
verklaren. Interessant is dat bezoeken aan en reizen naar het buitenland en het bezoeken 
van een ziekenhuis of gezondheidsinstelling in het buitenland langer dan twee maanden 
geleden, geen significante risicofactoren waren in de case control studie. (hoofdstuk 5). 
Het blijft de vraag of het arbitraire afkappunt van twee maanden voor een ziekenhuisbe-
zoek in het buitenland niet te strikt en niet te algemeen is, aangezien arbitrair afkappen 
het duiden van een MRSA als MUO of als MKO mede bepaalt. (hoofdstuk 5) 
Ons advies is wel om zeevarenden toe te voegen als risicogroep voor MRSA drager-
schap. Gezien de hoge prevalentie van dragerschap onder zeevarenden raden we aan 
dat alle zeevarenden worden ingedeeld als WIP-categorie 2 en dus gescreend worden op 
MRSA wanneer zij aanwezig zijn in Nederland, ongeacht of zij wonden of onderliggende 
ziekte hebben; en dat preventieve isolatie wordt toegepast in afwachting van de testresul-
taten. Sinds 2010 zijn zeevarenden opgenomen in de triage bij opname van het Erasmus 
MC (en het voormalige Havenziekenhuis). Over de wereldwijde impact van overdracht 
van MRSA door zeevarenden is momenteel niets bekend (hoofdstuk 4).
case control risicofactoren: intersectie gezondheidszorg en 
gemeenschap
De resultaten van de MUO case control geven aan dat een groot deel van de MUO 
cases gezondheidszorg of ziekte gerelateerd zijn, omdat we risicofactoren hebben 
gevonden zoals antibioticagebruik en ambulante zorg. We toonden aan dat MUO dra-
gers in een eerdere periode gescreend waren tijdens een contactonderzoek, maar op 
dat moment niet als MRSA-drager waren gedetecteerd. Het lijkt erop dat MUO dragers 
regelmatig contact hebben met de gezondheidszorg, maar niet noodzakelijkerwijs met 
een ziekenhuis. Hoogstwaarschijnlijk hebben ze hun MRSA tijdens of door het ontvangen 
van gezondheidszorg verworven, mogelijk buiten het ziekenhuis waar de openbare en 
institutionele gezondheidszorg elkaar raken. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn ambulante zorg 
of het gebruik van antibiotica in verpleeghuizen of de huisartsenzorg. (hoofdstuk 5) Het 
toevoegen van de aangetoonde, meer algemene, risicofactoren aan de risicocategorieën 
van de Nederlandse MRSA richtlijn van de WIP zal mogelijk het aantal MUO kunnen 
verminderen. Echter, het zal ook tot hoge kosten van screening leiden en een hogere 
werklast genereren, zeker als we er voor kiezen om de extra gescreende patiënten ook 
pre-emptief te isoleren, vanwege de verwachte hoge aantallen die daar dan voor in 
aanmerking komen. Met andere woorden, het totale aantal mensen dat gescreend moet 
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worden om één MUO drager te vinden met de nieuwe, algemene risicofactoren zoals het 
gebruik van ambulante zorg of het gebruik van antibiotica, kan door toevoeging van deze 
gevonden risicofactoren te hoog worden en daardoor te duur en te arbeidsintensief. Toch 
verklaarden onze algemene risicofactoren 83% van de MUO cases in de case control. 
Een andere aanpak middels risico algoritme is daarom gewenst, (vide infra). Voor de 
overige 17% van de MUO cases werd geen verklaring gevonden. 
Voor case control studies is de keuze van de controles moeilijk maar belangrijk. Zoals 
hierboven vermeld, vonden we algemene risicofactoren die 83% van MUO cases ver-
klaarden. De uitkomst van een case control studie hangt echter in hoge mate af van de 
keuze van de controle; gematched of niet. Onze studie naar de kenmerken van MUO 
(hoofdstuk 1) en de initiële “trawling” vragenlijst (hoofdstuk 5) gaven een zeer diverse 
groep van dragers weer, een diversiteit die beter gerepresenteerd werd door te kiezen 
voor een controlegroep vanuit de gemeenschap (“community”). Cases, d.w.z. MUO 
dragers, waren niet alleen MRSA dragers gerapporteerd door ziekenhuizen, maar ook 
MRSA dragers gerapporteerd door huisartsen (HA) of langdurige zorgfaciliteiten (LDZF). 
Indien we de controles zouden matchen op opname of behandeling in het ziekenhuis, of 
op gedetecteerd zijn bij de huisarts dan wel in de Verpleeg- en verzorgingstehuis (VVT) 
sector, dan zouden er verschillende controle populaties nodig zijn. Ook hebben we over-
wogen om controles te matchen op het hebben van een (vermoedelijke) infectie, omdat 
MUO vaak worden ontdekt als bijkomstigheid wanneer een kweek wordt aangevraagd 
voor de detectie van een infectie. Dit was echter niet mogelijk omdat het niet zeker was 
of gerapporteerde gevallen daadwerkelijk een infectie hadden of niet. De registratie van 
de aanwezigheid van infectie is namelijk niet betrouwbaar. Als het ingediende isolaat van 
de case niet een isolaat van een infectie locatie was, dan sloot dit geen infectie elders 
of later uit. Bovendien was onze case control opgezet om onbekende risicofactoren te 
vinden zonder vooroordelen. Matching zou vooroordelen introduceren en de kans op het 
vinden van risicofactoren verminderen. Daarom kozen we voor niet-gematchte controles 
vanuit de bevolking, waardoor vooroordelen zoveel mogelijk werden beperkt en de kans 
werd gemaximaliseerd om nieuwe risicofactoren binnen de MUO populatie te vinden. 
Gezien de bekende prevalentie van MRSA in de gemeenschap (tussen 0 en 0,11%8) 
beschouwden we de kans om een  MRSA drager als controle in onze studie op te nemen 
dusdanig laag dat er niet op gescreend hoefde te worden.
Om patiënten te kunnen identificeren met een verhoogd risico op MRSA dragerschap, 
is een algoritme noodzakelijk dat het a-priori risico voor MRSA dragerschap berekent met 
behulp van de bestaande en de nieuwe risicofactoren. Helaas zijn een aantal nieuwe 
risicofactoren te algemeen en/of veel voorkomend om ze als een ja/nee-antwoord in 
de normale triage te includeren. In de toekomst zal daarom een algoritme ontwikkeld 
moeten worden waarin risicofactoren worden gewogen in een specifieke populatie, zodat 
een gewogen risico kan worden berekend op basis van meer dan één risicofactor. De 
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uitkomst van dit algoritme moet dan leiden tot het instellen van eventuele maatregelen 
om overdracht van MRSA te voorkomen. Idealiter moet gestreefd worden naar nationale 
uniformiteit in dit algoritme en de uitvoering daarvan.
Om de haalbaarheid en volledigheid te verbeteren, zou een interactieve chatbot kun-
nen worden geprogrammeerd met vragen die door patiënten kunnen worden ingevuld 
wanneer zij worden opgenomen of behandeld. De ingevoerde antwoorden kunnen in een 
algoritme worden geladen om het a-priori risico van MRSA dragerschap te berekenen. 
Chatbot technologie is al mogelijk en wordt gebruikt door bedrijven met veel klanten, 
zoals KLM.16 
Mrsa recidivering na Mrsa eradicatie therapie
MRSA recidieven worden gemist wanneer slechts drie follow-up kweeksets worden 
gebruikt na MRSA eradicatie therapie. Tevens zullen deze MRSA recidieven dan later 
gedetecteerd kunnen worden als MUO. We hebben aangetoond dat MRSA recidieven 
worden gemist in 54% (35/65 recidieven) bij het gebruik van drie follow-up kweeksets in 
vergelijking met zes follow-up kweeksets. Op basis van onze resultaten werd de toen-
malige WIP-richtlijn gewijzigd op de timing van kweeksets na MRSA eradicatie therapie 
(hoofdstuk 3). We bevelen vijf kweeksets aan binnen een jaar na de eradicatie therapie. 
In de zes maanden na de eradicatie therapie, raden we aan om behandelde dragers die 
het risico lopen op een vroeg recidief regelmatig te kweken. Personen met een verhoogde 
kans op een vroeg recidief, zijn de neus en keel dragers (OR 25.5 (1.6-419.1)) of degenen 
die intravasculaire lijnen hebben (OR 13.6 (1.2-156.2)). Personen die laat recidiveren, 
kunnen hun vervolgkweken met meer tijd ertussen afnemen en zouden één jaar na hun 
eradicatie therapie hun laatste controle kweek moeten krijgen. Personen met een vroeg 
recidief, wil je sneller vangen en recidiveren binnen een half jaar. Deze personen zouden 
dan niet tot een jaar na hun eradicatie therapie hoeven te wachten op de laatste controle 
kweek. Deze aanbeveling is een balans tussen de noodzaak van snelle detectie van 
een MRSA recidief, de belasting van de patiënt en het verlagen van het aantal gemiste 
MRSA-recidieven na succesvolle MRSA eradicatie therapie.
Misclassificatie van MKO als MUO
We kwamen een groot aantal misgeclassificeerde MKO isolaten van dragers tegen die 
in de nationale MRSA database als MUO geregistreerd stonden. Analyse van de case 
control studie toonde aan dat 38% van alle gerapporteerde MUO isolaten in de MRSA 
surveillance database in feite een MKO was. Misclassificatie kan worden verklaard door 
het te vroeg invullen van bijbehorende epidemiologische gegevens aan het RIVM, die 
tezamen met de MRSA stam door de MML aan het RIVM worden opgestuurd. Te vroeg 
aanleveren van gegevens, met name voordat de typering bekend is, geeft onvolledige 
informatie (hoofdstuk 5). Het is namelijk niet altijd mogelijk om de bron vast te stellen 


















MUO met case control risicofactoren
Gemisclassificeerde MKO
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figuur 1 – Nederlandse Mrsa en MUO, relatieve bijdragen
Data voor MUO werden gegenereerd met behulp van resultaten van de MUO case control studie en 
geëxtrapoleerd naar de Nethmap 2018 MRSA data (n = 2792). Data voor MKO werden gegenereerd 
door het gebruik van MRSA surveillance data van 2008-2011 en door het extrapoleren van het gemid-
delde percentage naar de gegeven getallen in de Nethmap 2018 data. De definitie van gemisclassi-
ficeerd: MRSA isolaten aangegeven als MUO door de MML’s in de vragenlijst verzonden naar het RIVM 










Totaal MUO Totaal MKO
MUO met en zonder case control risico factoren 
vergeleken met risicogroepen MKO
(n=2792 totaal MRSA)
MUO met case control risicofactoren Onopgeloste MUO
Gemisclassificeerde MKO MKO (contact met vee)
MKO (contact met MRSA drager) MKO (adoptiekind)
MKO (buitenlands ziekenhuis) MKO (medewerker gezondheidszorg in het buitenland)
figuur 2 – MUO vergeleken met MkO in absolute aantallen
Data voor MUO werden gegenereerd met behulp van resultaten van de MUO case control studie en 
geëxtrapoleerd naar de Nethmap 2018 MRSA data (n = 2792). Data voor MKO werden gegenereerd 
door het gebruik van MRSA surveillance data van 2008-2011 en door het extrapoleren van het gemid-
delde percentage naar de gegeven getallen in de Nethmap 2018 data. De definitie van gemisclassi-
ficeerd: MRSA isolaten aangegeven als MUO door de MML’s in de vragenlijst verzonden naar het RIVM, 
maar gedefinieerd in onze case control studie als MKO.
126 Chapter 9
voordat het typeringsresultaat beschikbaar is. Typeringsresultaten zijn er voor om bron-
nen en transmissieroutes te verklaren. Wanneer de bronnen vanuit de zorg komen, kan 
de MRSA drager worden gedefinieerd als een MKO. De oplossing voor dit probleem 
is een tweestapsprocedure: eerst wordt de stam verzonden en vervolgens, na het te-
rugkrijgen en analyseren van de typeringsresultaten, wordt de MML gevraagd voor de 
uiteindelijke epidemiologische beslissing of er sprake is van een MKO of een MUO. Deze 
beslissing zal afhangen van de (veronderstelde) bronnen en risicofactoren van de drager. 
Idealiter worden de typeringsresultaten binnen de kortste doorlooptijd teruggestuurd 
naar de medische professionals om contact onderzoek inspanningen te ondersteunen 
en te helpen met het definiëren van MRSA-bronnen. Dit laatste moet vervolgens terug 
gerapporteerd worden aan de MRSA surveillance, waardoor de betrouwbaarheid van de 
epidemiologische gegevens verder wordt verbeterd.
Misclassificatie is te wijten aan de kwaliteit van de epidemiologische gegevens. Deze 
kwaliteit is gebaseerd op de tijd, moeite en mogelijkheid om de gegevens te verkrijgen. 
Momenteel is er geen standaardprocedure bij het contacteren en bevragen van MRSA 
dragers, voor het uitvoeren van het contact onderzoek en ook niet wie dat dan zou moe-
ten doen. De inspanning die geleverd wordt, zal dus per persoon verschillen, en daarmee 
de kwaliteit. Een procedure voor ondervraging en voor het contact opnemen met MRSA 
dragers is daarom aan te bevelen. Er kan namelijk ook sprake zijn van misclassificatie 
door een te beperkt contact onderzoek uit te voeren bij MRSA uitbraken (hoofdstuk 5 
en 6). Een te klein contact onderzoek mist MRSA dragers (en dus MKO) welke later ter 
plaatse of elders als MUO kunnen worden gedetecteerd. Dit zou de gevonden risicofactor 
in de case control studie kunnen verklaren: eerder in het verleden gescreend voor MRSA-
dragerschap, maar op dat moment MRSA negatief bevonden.
Onverklaarde MUO en de noodzaak tot samenwerking en typering
Het deel van de MUO cases dat niet kon worden verklaard was 17%. Met de Nethmap 
2018 data zou dit betekenen dat van de 661 gerapporteerde MUO isolaten in 2017 (23% 
van de totale gemelde MRSA voor de surveillance), 17% (112/661) zonder verklaring zou 
blijven. Dat zou 4% (112/2792) van de totale MRSA zijn die in 2017 aan de MRSA-sur-
veillance werd gerapporteerd. (Figuur 1) Deze resterende groep bestaat uit verschillende 
MUO cases waarbij we in onze studie geen risicofactoren konden identificeren. Een deel 
van deze MUO cases kan wellicht nog worden opgehelderd als genoom data van MRSA 
isolaten tussen zorginstellingen of binnen een ZorgRegio worden gecombineerd, al dan 
niet op nationaal niveau. We hebben aangetoond dat twee MML’s in de regio Rotterdam 
onafhankelijk van elkaar een MUO ontdekten, zonder te weten dat deze twee genetisch 
aan elkaar verwant waren, door cgMLST-resultaten aan elkaar te koppelen (hoofdstuk 
6). We laten in hoofdstuk 6 ook zien dat we onderscheid konden maken tussen klonale 
t008 MRSA clusters door gebruik te maken van cgMLST. Het toepassen van cgMLST 
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data om MML te helpen bij het traceren van contactpersonen zou van cruciaal belang 
kunnen zijn om de laatste 17% van MUO in Nederland op te helderen.
Bij voorkeur worden deze gegevens ook gedeeld op het niveau van het regionale 
netwerk van zorginstellingen om intraregionale (uitbraak) clusters te detecteren (zoals 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 6). Het huidige antibioticaresistentiezorgnetwerk of ZorgRegio 
ABR kan deze taak op zich nemen en een manier te vinden om gegevens over MRSA 
stammen, typeringen en dragers te delen. Idealiter zouden zorginstellingen binnen de 
zorgregio geïnformeerd moeten worden over MRSA dragers in de regio. Binnen de 
ZorgRegio’s kunnen zorginstellingen gevraagd worden afspraken te maken over het 
delen van deze informatie en het gelijktrekken van beleid, rekening houdend met de pri-
vacywetgeving. Het delen van informatie over MRSA dragers en MRSA stammen tussen 
instituten, met name als de patiënt niet direct wordt overgeplaatst, is zeer wenselijk vanuit 
het oogpunt van infectiepreventie, maar is mogelijk op dit moment nog een brug te ver.
Kort samengevat doen wij de volgende aanbevelingen: het doen van verdere studies 
naar MUO CC398, het monitoren van MUO CC398 in de surveillance en de terugkoppe-
ling daarvan op nationaal en MML niveau, het toevoegen van zeevarenden als MRSA 
risicogroep aan de geldende richtlijn, alsook indelen als WIP-categorie 2, het maken van 
een risico algoritme, waarin een gewogen a-priori risico wordt berekend op basis van 
meerdere risicofactoren, het doen van vijf follow-up kweeksets waarvan vier in de eerste 
twee maanden (de vierde op 2 maanden) na MRSA eradicatie therapie en de laatste 
follow-up kweekset na een half jaar of een jaar, afhankelijk van de aanwezigheid van 
risicofactoren of het zijn van een medewerker in de gezondheidszorg. Andere aanbeve-
lingen zijn het reduceren van de misclassificatie door intensievere samenwerking tussen 
RIVM waar getypeerd wordt en de MML die de epidemiologische gegevens aanleveren, 
het delen van minstens de typeringsdata binnen de ZorgRegio en zo mogelijk ook supra-
regionaal, zodat arbitraire grenzen tussen adherentiegebieden van MML niet langer het 
vinden van clusters in de weg staat, en het vervolgen van de aantallen MUO aangezien bij 
17% van de MUO vooralsnog geen risicofactor dan wel verklaring gevonden is. Blijvende 
controle op MUO is essentieel om de prevalentie van MRSA in ons land laag te houden! 
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Ziekenhuismanagement, NVMM en Academie voor Medisch Specialisten 2018
Ziekenhuismanagement, Desiderius school 2019
 
Oral and poster presentations
ISSSI 2010 (Bath, UK) - Dutch MRSA of Unknown Origin (poster) 2010
Scientific Autumn Meeting NVMM (Amsterdam, The Netherlands) – Dutch MRSA of Unknown 
Origin (invited speaker and poster)
2010
Boerhaave nascholing & WIP congress (Leiden, The Netherlands) – MRSA van onbekende 
origine (invited speaker)
2011
VHIG congress (Almelo, The Netherlands) – MUO in het oranje schemergebied (Invited speaker) 2012
ISSSI 2012 (Lyon, France) - Three is not enough; or why follow-up needs more cultures (poster), 
Search & Destroy policy evaluated (poster), Mobile genetic elements of ST398 MRSA in humans 
and four animal species: a comparison (poster)
2012
ECCMID 2013 (Berlin, Germany) - High prevalence of MRSA in seafarers in The Netherlands 
(poster)
2013
Scientific Spring Meeting NVMM (Papendal, The Netherlands) - Transmission by not isolated 




ICAAC 2014 (Washington DC, USA) - Linking USA300 CA-MRSA to Dutch Hospital Outbreaks 
(poster)
2014
ISSSI 2014 (Chicago, USA) – New risk factors revealed for MRSA in The Netherlands: A case-
control study (invited speaker), Unknown risk factors revealed for MRSA in The Netherlands; a 
case-control study (poster)
2014
ISSSI 2016 (Seoul, South Korea) – Epidemiology of MRSA of Unknown Origin (MUO) (poster) 2016
 
teaching
Supervision of second year medical students, as part of their medical training during various 
practical ‘VO-onderwijs’ and clinical case sessions.
2013-2019
Supervision of third year medical students, as part of their medical and scientific training 2012
 
Other
President of Young European Federalists, The Hague 2018-2019
Member of the 1st NVAMM sailing committee 2017
Founder and member of the FeestCIE MMIZ, ErasmusMC 2013-2016
Member of the FeestCIE, EPI, RIVM 2010-2013
Member of the Research Day committee, MMIZ, ErasmusMC 2012
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cUrricUlUM vitae
Sybren Lekkerkerk was born on September the 6th, 1985 in Gouda, The Netherlands. He 
grew up in the quaint little city of Haastrecht, tucked away between the polders and the 
rivers Vlist and Hollandsche IJssel. In 2003, he graduated from the Coornhert Gymnasium 
in Gouda and started his medical training at the Erasmus University Medical Center in 
Rotterdam the same year. In 2009, he finished his medical doctorate (MD) and obtained 
the title of doctorandus under supervision of dr. H.F.L. Wertheim and J.L. Nouwen; but 
not before travelling to Vietnam for an internship at the Oxford Clinical Research Unit in 
Hà Nội (Hanoi). Just before graduating, he started his PhD-research at the department 
of medical microbiology of the Erasmus University Medical Center on MRSA of Unknown 
Origin, under supervision of Prof. dr. H.A. Verbrugh (now em. prof. dr.) and Prof. dr. M.C. 
Vos. Between 2009 and 2014 he regularly worked at the department of epidemiology 
and surveillance of the RIVM as part of his PhD-research and communted daily back and 
forth between either Lelystad and Bilthoven or Rotterdam. In 2014, he started as clinical 
resident of medical microbiology under supervision of Prof. dr. H.A. Verbrugh (briefly), 
Dr. A.G. Vonk, Dr. R.W. Vreede, and Dr. L.C. Smeets at the departments of medical mi-
crobiology of the Erasmus University Medical Center in Rotterdam and of the Reinier de 
Graaf Gasthuis, locatie Reinier Haga Medisch Diagnostisch Centrum (RHMDC) in Delft, 
respectively. At the time of writing, Sybren is living in Hoogvliet Rotterdam together with 




Lang, lang geleden in een voorportaal van een kantoor hier ver, ver vandaan (gesloopt), 
besloot ik heel naïef dat ik wilde promoveren. Het liefst in vier jaar. Het werd iets langer. 
Het is – cliché alert - zonder twijfel de grootste uitdaging die ik mezelf heb aangedaan. 
Maar als u1 dit leest, betekent het dat mijn boekje nu toch een feit is. 
Mijn woestijntocht naar een ongrijpbare horizon lijkt daarmee ten einde.2 
Reflecterend op deze tocht, realiseer ik me dat ik onderweg velerlei mensen ben 
tegengekomen. Sommigen slechts als passanten of figuranten, anderen om verder mee 
te lopen, deels of tot het eind. Zoals beeldhouwers interacteren met een stuk steen en zo 
een beeld creëren, vormen, zo deden deze mensen dat, al dan niet bewust, met mij. Ik 
ben ze dus veel dank verschuldigd.
Echter, na tien jaar is de lijst te lang om iedereen bij naam te noemen en persoonlijk te 
bedanken. (Wellicht ten overvloede omdat u het uiteraard al gelezen had, maar een deel 
van de mensen die ik dankbaar ben, staan genoemd op het eind van hoofdstuk 6 en zul-
len niet herhaald worden.) Staat u niet specifiek met naam genoemd in het dankwoord? 
Bent u toch benieuwd hoe ik onze samenwerking vond? Vraag het me gerust! 
Wie een betekenisvol dankwoord wil schrijven, kan overigens putten uit de clichés van 
voorgangers. In de voorbereiding, kwamen een aantal gouwe ouwen voorbij, die ik u 
niet wil onthouden: In het dankwoord is alles al een keer gezegd en geschreven. Het 
proefschrift kwam tot stand door inzet en wilskracht. Met dank aan veel verschillende, 
samenwerkende mensen. Het dankwoord is een van de moeilijkst te schrijven doch 
meest gelezen onderdeel van het proefschrift. Pieken, dalen, uitdaging, etc. etc. Bedankt, 
wat hadden we een toffe tijd. Fijn dat je me pipeteerslaaf was. Ik hoop dat ik die ene niet 
vergeten ben. Ik hou van je. We zien elkaar weer spoedig, echt waar! (Maar niet heus.)
Was op het eind, in retrospectie, de weg er naartoe belangrijker dan het behalen van het 
einddoel zelf? Mijns inziens is vooral de combinatie, een weg met een eind, het meest 
waardevol. Hiervan is het dankwoord een onderdeel.
Overigens, als u van klassieke dankwoorden zonder lange introducties houdt, dan had u 
deze pagina over kunnen slaan. Helaas, volgende keer beter.
1 Als u geen probleem heeft met tutoyeren, mag u ook je of jij lezen.
2 Soundtrack: John Frusciante’s Central van het album The Empyrean
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Beste Prof. dr. M.C. Vos, beste Greet, van alle mensen die ik de afgelopen tien jaar tegen 
kwam, heb ik veruit het meest van jou geleerd. In alle eerlijkheid is de gehele backbone 
van mijn professionele standaard gevormd door onze interactie. Hoewel ik veel van 
allerlei supervisoren geleerd heb, ben jij figuurlijk de smid geweest die het zwaard tien 
jaar geleden in het vuur van de smidse stak en het heeft gevormd door het eindeloos te 
bewerken met hamer. Dat was een zware taak, maar een rol die je desondanks vervulde 
ondanks alles. Dat heeft mij heel veel opgeleverd voor het proefschrift, als toekomstig 
arts-microbioloog, en als mens. Heel veel dank daarvoor! 
Beste dr. Vonk, beste Alieke, hoewel ik als AIOS een afscheidscadeau van je voorganger 
was, hoop ik dat mijn lange aanwezigheid mee viel. Jij leidt mensen op, niet alleen maar 
AIOS. Die instelling heeft me veel gebracht, ook tijdens de diepe dalen gedurende het 
promotie traject. Daarvoor mijn eeuwige dank.
Beste dr. Van Wamel, beste Willem, ik weet dat je niet van die artsen houdt. Maar ik 
hoop dat ik op je lijstje sta van artsen die ok zijn. Het werk in het lab en het daaruit voort-
vloeiende MUO CC398 deel van het proefschrift blijft mijn favoriete onderdeel. Ik heb 
genoten van onze discussies en uitwisselingen van gedachten. Je deur stond altijd open 
om geduldig te luisteren of te discussiëren, ook toen je niet mijn officiële co-promotor was. 
Bedankt voor alles!
Beste dr. de Greeff, beste Sabine, je was mijn Nienke II, nadat die vertrok naar ECDC. Ik 
ben dankbaar voor je hulp bij mijn epidemiologische vraagstukken, alsook je meedenken 
aan de MUO studie. Maar goed, die goede discussies en meedenk-momenten had ik ook 
met Nienke, Marianne, Tjalling, en vele anderen binnen EPI (waarvoor mijn dank). Echter, 
jij leerde mij iets dat veel waardevoller is, en passant nog wel. Kantoorhumor moet je een 
kans geven, vertelde je me toen je post-its plakte op een koelkast. Ik weet niet meer de 
aanleiding, maar het dreef de secretaresse tot waanzin. Kantoorhumor heb ik sindsdien 
met succes een kans gegeven, en dat zal ik blijven doen. Dank je wel voor het doorgeven 
van deze wijsheid, het leven is immers (te) kort.
Beste dr. Vreede en dr. van Trijp, beste Rolf en Marijke, zonder jullie was er helemaal geen 
boekje gekomen. Na alle voor en tegens tegen elkaar afgewogen te hebben, besloot ik de 
stekker eruit te trekken die middag in Delft. Op dat moment hebben jullie niet getwijfeld en 
op me ingepraat. Waarvoor mijn dank! (Toch wel.)
Beste dr. Bosch en dr. Schouls, beste Thijs en Leo, dank jullie wel voor jullie hulp en inzet 
toen het WGS onderzoek na Schotland niet goed liep. Mijn dank ook voor jullie immer 
waardevolle input daarna. 
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Beste prof. dr. Richardus, prof. dr. Wertheim en prof. dr. Kluytmans, dank jullie wel voor 
het plaats nemen in de leescommissie van mijn proefschrift. Ik waardeer dit zeer.
Beste Heiman en Jan (Nouwen), dank jullie wel dat ik tien jaar geleden de mogelijkheid 
had om stage te lopen in Hanoi. Het had veel impact, op een goede manier, voor mijzelf 
als voor anderen. 
Beste co-auteurs, secretaresses, (research)analisten en DIP’ers, niets functioneert goed 
zonder jullie en jullie inzet. Dank jullie wel dat jullie elke dag weer opstaan om mensen 
zoals ik in het (onderzoeks)werk te helpen. Het maakte in positieve zin een wereld van 
verschil!
Beste oud kamergenoten, ik weet serieus niet meer met hoeveel jullie nu uiteindelijk zijn. 
Zowel de duur van mijn promotietraject als de introductie van flexwerken heeft de teller 
dusdanig opgedreven dat ik de tel ben kwijtgeraakt. Ik hoop dat jullie me een prettige 
kamergenoot vonden waarop jullie met plezier terugkijken. In ieder geval: dank jullie wel 
voor jullie tijd, aandacht, gedeelde muzieksmaak (indien van toepassing) en uiteraard 
gezelligheid. Sommigen van jullie waren prettig gestoord, en ik kijk daar met plezier op 
terug.
Lieve ex-mede-AIOS (in het bijzonder maar zeker niet uitsluitend: Martijn, Khoa, Maurits, 
George, Tien, Dimard, Angga, Carla, Marrit, Maris, Annemiek, Kara en Ga-Lai), het werken 
met jullie was elke dag een feest. Dank jullie wel voor jullie collegialiteit en vriendschap 
tijdens en na het werk! 
Maike, dank voor je don’t-ask-don’t-tell policy rondom mijn promotietraject. Ik realiseer 
me dat ik broodnodig dat ene e-mailtje nog moet beantwoorden. Maar dat kan ik dan 
eindelijk zonder schuldgevoel over sociaal leven doen. Dank ook voor de fijne gesprek-
ken en lunchwandelingen in mijn RIVM periode!
Cédric, Manon, Dylan, Lucia: thank you for the shared journey we took towards European 
Federalism and your friendship. I had a lot of fun working on it.
Paul, Willem Jan, Suus en Annemieke: dank voor de lange, goede vriendschap bij goed 
en slecht weer. Binnenkort maar weer eens afspreken?
Lieve mam, je bent een power-vrouw door weer en wind! Je maakt me trots en ik houd 
van je! Dank je wel voor alle steun die je altijd hebt gegeven!
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Lieve, lieve Liên, chồng yêu vợ rất nhiều. Dank je wel dat je bent wie je bent. Moge er 
samen nog vele mooie momenten komen.
Oh mijn kleine Evelien, je maakt het leven fantastisch.
Eindelijk klaar.
En nu maar hopen dat ik die ene niet vergeten ben.
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